2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and previous Review Conference outcomes

Report submitted by the Netherlands*

1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands hereby submits its national report in accordance with the requirements stated in action 20 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. The present report describes the activities the Netherlands, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, has undertaken to contribute to the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology since the Review Conference of 2010. In the view of the Netherlands all three pillars are of equal importance.

3. The Netherlands policy towards nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy is reflected in the letter of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Frans Timmermans, to the House of Parliament on 24 October 2013. It has also been reflected in the more recent policy note on international security of the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Bert Koenders, of 14 November 2014.

4. The Netherlands is an active member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In the EU, the Netherlands participates in the working parties on Non-Proliferation (CONOP), Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN) and Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) and other forms of EU cooperation related to this field. In NATO, the activities of the Netherlands also include work related to the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

5. Through its membership in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) the Netherlands is actively engaged to further nuclear disarmament and strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. The group of 12 countries (Australia, Canada,

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Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates) is promoting the implementation of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Action Plan in a practical and realistic manner. The NPDI has submitted to the Review Conference a total of 18 working papers for deliberation and organised a number of side events. Working paper NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16 contains recommendations for consideration in an outcome document of the 2015 Review Conference.

6. The Netherlands further participates in the work of the Vienna Group of Ten which has submitted a working paper to the Review Committee on seven topics for consideration, namely the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), compliance and verification, export controls, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security, and withdrawal from the NPT.

Pillar I. Nuclear disarmament (actions 1 to 22)

7. The Netherlands has, with the NPDI, submitted several working papers on issues related to nuclear disarmament. These include papers on increased transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons, on reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, on nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances and on de-alerting (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.3, WP.4 and WP.24; and NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.6, respectively). Early in the Review Cycle, the NPDI provided the nuclear-weapons States a draft reporting form on transparency on nuclear arsenals to be used for their reporting under action 21 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12). For the 2015 Review Conference, it submitted a paper on transparency for non-nuclear weapon states (NPT/CONF.2014.WP.17).

8. In the context of the NATO Russia Council, the Netherlands hosted a three-day workshop in June 2013 in The Hague on the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines. The workshop, during which each of the four participating nuclear-weapon States made a presentation, aimed at improving mutual understanding and building trust.

9. During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the Netherlands will host a High Level Panel, focusing on the main challenges of the NPT and in particular on the prospects for disarmament. Panellists will include the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, former US Senator and current CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative Sam Nunn, and Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexei Arbatov.

10. The Netherlands has, as co-chair for the session on transparency and verification and as "friend of the Chair", participated in the Open-Ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

11. The Netherlands has made a continued effort to promote the immediate start of negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In 2012, the Netherlands, together with Germany, organised two scientific expert workshops on a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in Geneva. In 2014 and 2015, an expert from the Netherlands actively participated in a Group of Governmental Experts tasked to make recommendations on possible elements of a treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear

weapons. The Netherlands further provided the Office of Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, on a cost-free basis, an expert for a period of 3 years to support the work of the Group of Governmental Experts. Furthermore, the Netherlands has been actively supporting the activities of the International Panel on Fissile Material. For several years, the Netherlands has hosted presentations by the Panel of its yearly report and their recently published book, as side events of the Conferences of Parties to the NPT and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.

12. The Netherlands played a leading role in drawing up the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, a key element of the disarmament architecture. The Netherlands ratified the treaty in 1999 and has since then made numerous efforts to promote the entry into force of the treaty. From the outset, the Netherlands has been an active member of the 'Friends of the CTBT', a group of countries that every second year organises a Ministerial meeting in the margins of the meeting of the UN General Assembly to promote the entry into force of the CTBT. In 2014, its joint Ministerial Statement was associated by a record number of 104 States. Also, the Netherlands participated at ministerial level at Article XIV conferences.

13. In anticipation of the entry into force of the treaty, the Netherlands has helped to set up the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organisation in Vienna and has supported the buildup of the International Monitoring System. Apart from fulfilling its assessed regular budget responsibilities to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, the Netherlands provides extra-budgetary funds to enhance participation by experts from developing countries in the technical working group meetings. Further extra-budgetary funds to the CTBTO are channelled through consecutive EU Council Decisions. The Netherlands has also financially supported the work of the chairman of working group B.

14. The Netherlands is a strong supporter of the role of civil society, which is important in the effective functioning of the NPT and the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan. The Netherlands supported the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a non-governmental organisation that monitors the implementation of the Action Plan in the form of an annual report, including its Reaching Critical Will programme. The Netherlands also contributes financially to and cooperates with the Netherlands-based non-governmental organisation PAX for Peace on NPT-related issues.

15. The Netherlands provided financial support to think tanks like Wilton Park and the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, in organising their NPT workshops that bring participants together in the run-up to the Preparatory Committees of this review cycle. In 2012 and 2014, the Netherlands also co-funded and participated in a non-proliferation conference organised by the Centre for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow.

16. The Netherlands has constructively participated in conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear explosions in Oslo (2013), in Nayarit and Vienna (both in 2014). The Netherlands shared the outcomes of research conducted by the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, which was aimed at improving the understanding of especially late health effects of radiation exposure. Furthermore, the Netherlands financially supported the non-governmental organisation International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) to facilitate the involvement of civil-society organisations at the conference in Vienna.

17. The Netherlands considers the education of the younger generation on disarmament an issue of great importance. To further this goal the Netherlands financially supports the training programme at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation as well as the summer school programmes on weapons of mass destruction organised by the Netherlands Asser Institute. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has further funded three PhD research projects on disarmament and non-proliferation, to train the next generation of experts in this field. Some of these PhD researchers have been part of the Netherlands delegation to the respective Preparatory Committees in this review cycle as well as to the 2015 Review Conference.

18. At the start of the 2015 Review Conference, the Netherlands — together with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University, and the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey — will organise an academic symposium. The main purpose of this event is to present and discuss worldwide research related to the NPT and to learn from early career scholars about present and future challenges and opportunities for the treaty. The symposium also aims at strengthening future decision-making related to the NPT.

19. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made regular presentations and briefings to students and detached a student reporter to participate in the youth exchange programme at the time of the Hiroshima NPDI ministerial meeting of April 2014 to reach out to fellow students on what Hiroshima means in the nuclear world, and why nuclear disarmament is so important. The Ministry also financially supported the participation of a representative of the non-governmental organization PAX.

Pillar II. Nuclear non-proliferation (actions 23 to 46 of the Action Plan)

20. The Netherlands has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in place, complemented by an Additional Protocol and considers the combination of these two the verification standard. In addition to fulfilling its assessed regular budget contributions fully and on time, the Netherlands has supported the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a voluntary contribution of €100,000 to organise outreach and training courses, and has provided technical support on the Additional Protocol to interested Member States. Such workshops and seminars were organized for Latin American and Caribbean States, African as well as some South Asian States, among them Myanmar. The Netherlands has also reached out to States without an Additional Protocol, through the combined efforts of the NPDI. The NPDI Ministers for Foreign Affairs sent a joint letter on the need for universalization and offered, in cooperation with the IAEA, their countries' practical assistance, best practices and know-how.

21. The Netherlands supports the IAEA in its efforts to develop and implement a less mechanistic safeguards system that better takes into account State-specific factors and that facilitates a more efficient and cost-effective use of the limited resources of the IAEA. To this end, the Netherlands fully endorses, bilaterally as well as a member State of the EU, the further development and application of the State-level concept by the IAEA.

22. The Netherlands is one of the 21 member States of the IAEA that supports further developments in safeguards and verification in practical terms by means of a voluntary member State support programme, which aims to provide IAEA with technical expertise to improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. The Netherlands contributes an annual €100,000 to this programme, hence adding up to €500,000 for the period between 2010 and 2015. Furthermore, the Netherlands contributed €250,000 to enhance the capabilities of the safeguards analytical services of the IAEA.

23. The Netherlands has consistently joined the international community in addressing cases of countries that are in non-compliance with their NPT obligations (Iran, Syria, DPRK) in relevant international fora, such as the UN General Assembly, the IAEA General Conference and its Board of Governors, as well as through implementation of the relevant sanctions regimes imposed by the UN Security Council.

24. The Netherlands supports the effort of the E3+3 and Iran to reach a negotiated solution to address the international community's concerns regarding the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Netherlands has contributed a total of €475,000 to the IAEA in order for it to verify the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.

25. Strengthening the system of robust export controls is considered of crucial importance by the Netherlands. According to the EU Dual-Use Export Regulation and the Dutch General Customs Act and Strategic Goods Decree nuclear materials (uranium and plutonium) and goods that can be used to manufacture such materials must be licensed. Goods that can, directly or indirectly, contribute to the development and production of nuclear weapons or their delivery systems are also subject to export controls. The Netherlands is an active member of the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which it chaired in 2011-2012. The Netherlands also chaired the NSG's Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE), the group that performed a fundamental review of the control lists and hosted several informal intersessionals.

26. The basic principles of the Netherlands export control policy on dual-use goods, including nuclear goods, are set out in the government response to the European Commission on the dual-use export control system of the EU Green Paper and the report on the written consultations on the subject, adopted on 21 October 2011. Together with its EU partners, the Netherlands is working for agreements on and implementation of export controls. Until recently, the Netherlands also held, the Chair of the sub-working group on non-proliferation of the European Nuclear Energy Forum.

27. Under the umbrella of the Global Partnership, the Netherlands participates in projects with and in Kazakhstan to seek, remove and safely dispose of radiological sources. The current project amounts to $1.65 million.

28. The Netherlands has played an active role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Since 2010 it has been chairing the Nuclear Detection Working Group and in March 2015 it has hosted the Nuclear Forensics trial simulation 'Glowing Tulip'; an international table top exercise involving nuclear- and forensic experts, judges and prosecutors to simulate the appropriate response to a terrorist incident with nuclear or radioactive material.

29. The Netherlands is proud to have joined the group of 33 countries, almost 2/3 of the participants of the NSS 2014 that contributed to a so called gift basket on the UNSC Resolution 1540. This group, led by Canada and the Republic of Korea, committed to fully implement the resolution 1540. The main purpose of this giftbasket is to fulfil the obligation to improve the security of nuclear material and to report on this more effectively. Where desired, the signatories will also help other countries fulfil their obligations under the resolution. The signatories also undertake to rapidly submit National Action Plans, as recommended in the resolution.

Pillar III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy (actions 47 to 64 of the Action Plan)

30. The Netherlands attaches great importance to the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the strengthening of nuclear security. This is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Netherlands was proud to host the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague on 24 and 25 March 2014, assembling 58 world leaders. Central points of the NSS process are the commitment to reduce the amount of the most sensitive nuclear materials, to enhance the security of all nuclear material and radioactive sources and to improve international cooperation. All leaders committed to the Communiqué which addressed, building on the work done at the NSS 2012 in Seoul, a number of important new themes. The NSS2014 Communiqué confirmed the central role of the IAEA and gave a more comprehensive overview of the existing international nuclear security architecture. There was also the introduction of confidence-building measures. Although nuclear security is a matter of national concern, leaders recognized that States can take voluntary measures in order to increase the confidence of other States in their nuclear security. Leaders also committed to minimizing stocks of plutonium. Following the commitment on highly enriched uranium which was agreed upon in 2010. Another new element was the increased emphasis on the relationship between States and the nuclear industry.

31. During the NSS 2014, the Netherlands, in close cooperation with the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, launched an initiative to strengthen implementation of the IAEA recommendations contained in Nuclear Security Series 13, 14 and 15. The Joint Statement was cosponsored by 35 countries; it has been circulated as IAEA/INFCIRC869. Further States wishing to subscribe are invited to do so by informing the IAEA Secretariat.

32. The 'Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Initiative' moreover commits States to improve the effectiveness of their nuclear security regimes and operators' systems by hosting peer reviews periodically. International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions use the IAEA recommendations as reference for their security review. The Netherlands is the first country in the world that hosted such missions in all its facilities and invited a follow-up mission in 2012 to review the implementation of earlier IPPAS recommendations. The Netherlands has also performed a self-assessment and has received an Integrated Regulatory Review mission at the end of 2014. The report with the conclusions of the peer review visit will be published shortly.

33. In a separate meeting during the NSS 2014, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and other representatives of the participating countries discussed a wider range of nuclear subjects, which included disarmament and non-proliferation.

34. In addition to the NSS 2014, three official side-events took place. The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael took the lead in organising the Nuclear Knowledge Summit, which brought together academia, think tanks and researchers. URENCO led the organisation of the Nuclear Industry Summit, a high-level event for Chief Executive Officers from the nuclear industry worldwide. An international tabletop exercise, @tomic 2014, was held in Maastricht, to promote cooperation between countries and expert communities in enhancing radiological and nuclear security and on preventing radiological and nuclear terrorism.

35. The Netherlands has started the process of conversion from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium targets for the production of medical isotopes. Necessary modifications to the production line at the Molybdenum production Facility in Petten are being applied. The conversion is expected to be finalized by the end of 2017.

36. Confirming its strong support for the work of the IAEA in the field of nuclear security, the Netherlands most recently contributed an amount of €1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) for the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan 2014-2017. The NSF is also strongly supported by significant extra-budgetary contributions from the EU's non-proliferation budget.

37. Additionally, the Netherlands supports the Agency's work on the universalization of the 2015 amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), by engaging in active outreach and by providing fund for the organisation of regional workshops. The Netherlands ratified the amendment in 2011. The Netherlands has granted the IAEA an additional €100,000 to support its work on the universalization of the amendment to the Convention.

38. In 2014, the Netherlands furthermore awarded the World Institute for Nuclear Security a grant of €100,000 for the start-up of the internationally certified training course for professionals in the field of nuclear security.

39. The Netherlands is a strong supporter of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme. In addition to its annual voluntary assessed contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund, the Netherlands — through the EU — has provided financial support to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, convinced it will facilitate further cooperation as enshrined in article IV of the Treaty.

40. The Netherlands is a strong believer in peer reviews, as it holds up a mirror to national review mechanisms and provides assurances to the international community. In the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear incident, the Netherlands has strongly advocated the mandatory nature of safety peer review missions in the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. The Netherlands participated in both the second extraordinary Peer Review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2012 and the sixth Peer Review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in Vienna from 24 March to 4 April 2014. It presented the safety situation in the Netherlands and, in particular, the post-Fukushima measures taken. The results of the meeting are summarized in the Summary Report, published on the IAEA website.

41. At both review meetings the observations were made that provisions should be taken to prevent and mitigate severe accidents with off-site consequences.

Following this observation, an international working group was formed, in which the Netherlands participated, which lead to the formulation of the "Vienna declaration on nuclear safety". The Vienna Declaration was adopted by the Contracting Parties at the Diplomatic Conference of the Convention on Nuclear Safety on February 9th, 2015.

42. In 2013, the Technical University of Delft established a pilot for a Master in Nuclear Security in cooperation with universities in Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Austria, the EU and the IAEA. The master aimed at training the new generations of experts that will improve the nuclear security worldwide.

Other topics

43. The Netherlands has consistently reaffirmed its support for the process for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The Netherlands recognizes the importance of this process in the NPT Review Cycle. The Netherlands continues to support the ongoing preparations for an effective Conference and thanks the Facilitator and his team once again for their tireless efforts in this regard. The Netherlands is one of the main financial contributors to the annual conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, organized by the Arab Institute of Security Studies in Jordan.

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada*

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) calls on States Parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan as well as of the 13 Practical Steps towards disarmament contained in the 2000 NPT RevCon Final Document, and of Article VI paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 NPT RevCon decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Canada submits this report to further fulfil these commitments. This report updates information provided in Canada's reports to NPT Preparatory Committee meetings in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10), 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9) and 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/8 and 9).

Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*

Nuclear Disarmament

1 Canada's international security policy continues to promote a step-by-step process toward the non-proliferation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons consistent with its NATO obligations and in a manner that promotes strategic stability for all.

Canada promotes this policy with its allies and partners in NATO, the G7, the Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), among others.

2 Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations, most notably through co-sponsorship of the NPDI's joint working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17).

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Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*
	Canada co-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution 69/37 entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", which called for NPT nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to strengthen transparency on implementing their nuclear disarmament commitments. Canada co-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution 69/52 entitled "United action toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which emphasized the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
3	N/A
4	N/A
5	N/A
6	Canada supports the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to deal with nuclear disarmament as part of a balanced and comprehensive program of work. Canada was prepared to join consensus on the Programme of Work proposed by the Mexican president of the CD on January 27, 2015 in document CD/WP.584, which included the establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament.
7	Canada supports the creation of a subsidiary body in the CD to address effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as part of a balanced and comprehensive program of work. Canada was prepared to join consensus on the Programme of Work proposed by the Mexican president of the CD on January 27, 2015 in document CD/WP.584, with included the establishment of subsidiary body in the CD to address effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
8	N/A
9	Canada supports the convening of a conference on a Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Canada joined consensus on UN General Assembly resolution 69/29 entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"; resolution 69/26 entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty"; resolution 69/36 entitled "Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia"; and resolution 69/63 entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status". Canada voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution 69/35 entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas" and resolution 69/66 entitled "Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2015".
10	N/A

Action	Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014
11	Canada signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on September 24, 1996, and ratified it on December 2, 1998. Canada's *CTBT Implementation Act* is being implemented provisionally pending the Treaty's entry into force.
12	Canada provides annual contributions on its efforts to promote the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT for inclusion in the UN Secretary-General's report to the UN General Assembly.
13	Canada co-hosted the eighth Ministerial Meeting on the CTBT in New York on September 24, 2014. The meeting produced a Joint Ministerial Statement that, *inter alia*, called on the remaining States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Canada co-sponsored and voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution 69/81 entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Canada submitted a summary of its activities to promote the universalization of the CTBT to the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the CTBT (A/69/137). Canada continues to support the on-going G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the entry into force and universalization of the CTBT.
14	All of the 16 stations and laboratories hosted by Canada as a part of the CTBT's International Monitoring System have been completed and certified by the CTBT Organization. Two technical experts from Natural Resources Canada participated as observers in the CTBTO's 2014 Integrated Field Exercise for on-site inspections that took place in Jordan in November-December 2014. The exercise featured airborne radiation detection equipment contributed by Canada to the CTBTO in September 2013. Canada also participated in the briefing and site tour on November 16.
15	Canada chaired sessions of the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in March-April 2014, August 2014, January 2015 and March-April 2015. Canada has actively called for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the CD or in another international forum. Canada was prepared to join consensus on the Programme of Work proposed by the Mexican president of the CD on January 27, 2015 in document CD/WP.584, with included the establishment of subsidiary body in the CD to negotiate a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.
16	N/A

Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*
17	Canada continues to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that surplus fissile material no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed.
18	In conformity with its legal obligations through its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arising from the NPT and as verified by regular IAEA inspections, Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
19	Canada participated in the inaugural meeting of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification held in Washington, D.C. on March 19-20, 2015.
20	Canada co-sponsored the NPDI's working paper on transparency by NPT non-nuclear weapon States (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17), which included a reporting template to provide greater transparency about steps that have been taken to implement the 2010 action plan.
21	In partnership with the NPDI, detailed comments and feedback was provided to each of the nuclear weapon States on their NPT implementation reports that were submitted at the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting with a view to strengthening the quantity, quality and frequency of such reports. Canada continues to endorse the NPDI's draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form as a template for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities by the nuclear weapon States. This form was submitted at the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting as a part of the working paper NPT/CONF.2015.PC.I/WP.12.
22	In partnership with a Canadian NGO, on January 19, 2015, the International Security, Research and Outreach Programme of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development awarded eight scholarships to post-graduate students at Canadian universities who produced research papers on select international security issues, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. On February 20, 2015, Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development hosted a debate among the post-graduate scholarship recipients in Ottawa which was moderated and attended by Canadian officials and the expert community.
23	Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	
24	Canada's CSA with the IAEA has been in place since February 21, 1972.
25	Canada continues to urge all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a CSA and Additional Protocol with the IAEA which we consider is the verification standard pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*
26	Since 2005, the IAEA has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Canada remains in peaceful purposes. This broader conclusion pursuant to Canada's CSA and Additional Protocol provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the NPT. Canada voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution 69/59 entitled "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments".
27	Iran's non-compliance with its NPT non-proliferation obligations represents one of the single greatest threats to the Treaty's integrity and authority. Canada continues to call on Iran to fully comply with all relevant UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and to work with the IAEA through the Framework of Cooperation to resolve all outstanding concerns regarding its nuclear activities, particularly those related to possible military dimensions. To this end, on April 2 Canada's Foreign Minister announced a $3 million contribution to support the IAEA's efforts to monitor Iran's compliance with its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action. In the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2014 and 2015, Canada reiterated its condemnation of DPRK's illicit nuclear weapons development activities, including nuclear testing, uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and ballistic missile testing. Canada continues to call on North Korea to fully comply with all UN Security Council resolutions, return to compliance with the NPT, return to compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and to fulfil its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. In the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2014 and 2015, Canada called on Syria to fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve outstanding issues regarding its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, particularly with regard to the Dair Alzour site and other related sites identified by the IAEA.
28	Canada's Additional Protocol with the IAEA was signed on September 24, 1998, and entered into force on September 8, 2000.
29	Canada continues to support the on-going G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the universalization of the Additional Protocol.
30	N/A
31	N/A
32	Canada supported fully the 2014 IAEA General Conference's endorsement of the State-level Concept (SLC) regarding safeguards implementation. Canada welcomes the IAEA's efforts to apply the SLC to all states with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing evolution of safeguards implementation necessary to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.
33	Canada paid its 2015 assessed contribution to the IAEA General Budget on time and in full. In 2015, Canada contributed approximately C$6 million to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF).

Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*
34	Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards.
35	Canada is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee and Wassenaar Arrangement.
36	Canada's export control system is consistent with the lists of multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates.
37	Canada's national export control system ensures that exports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or to an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations.
38	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) in place with 48 States, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
39	Cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country as well as their implementation of nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance and recommendations.
40	Canada maintains the highest level of effective physical protection at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework which integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign governments and international organizations. At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Steven Harper announced over C$28 million in programming through Canada's Global Partnership Program to enhance nuclear and radiological security. These projects include: physical protection projects to enhance the physical security of nuclear and radiological facilities in the Southeast Asia; illicit trafficking projects to enhance detection capabilities in the Middle East and at key ports in the Americas; radiological security projects to strengthen security and management of radioactive sources, including in countries with Canadian-origin sources in the Americas, Southeast Asia, Middle East and Africa; and projects which highlight cooperation with industry through development of security training for nuclear facility executives and a best practice guide on managing radiological sources in medical applications.

Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*
41	Canada maintains strong physical protection measures for its nuclear materials, including armed on-site response forces, constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection in Canada is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.
42	Canada ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) in December 2013.
43	Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada also strongly supports efforts by the IAEA to develop internationally harmonized guidance for implementing the recommendations of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in relation to the long term management of disused radioactive sources.
44	See Action 40 regarding assistance to States parties with a view to strengthening national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material. At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada co-sponsored a joint statement with the Republic of Korea on concrete initiatives in support of the full and universal implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which was supported by over 30 countries as well as the UN. In July 2014, Canada hosted a GPP-funded regional workshop in Manila on the implementation of voluntary national summary action plans, identifying national contact points and capacity building measures to further UNSCR 1540 implementation. In September 2014, Canada hosted with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) a workshop on WMD interdiction that took place in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. The event was funded through Canada's Global Partnership Program (GPP). In November 2014, Canada hosted a meeting on the presentation of nuclear forensics evidence in a court of law. This event aimed to prepare for the March 2015 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) workshop hosted by the Netherlands. GPP-funded assistance was also provided to partners to provide legislative assistance to strengthen WMD non-proliferation in Latin America and Southeast Asia; to build the legislative and legal capacity of states to facilitate the ratification of nuclear security instruments; to train chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive response teams in Mexico, Malaysia and Indonesia; and to strengthen export control and border security capacity in Southeast Asia.
45	Canada ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in November 2013.
46	The technical capabilities of a country's System and the nature and the scope of cooperation between that System and IAEA are two of the State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards. Canada continues to work with IAEA to further develop the State-level safeguards concept.

Action	Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

47	Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system and a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology, and radioisotopes.
48	See Action 39.
49	Canada provides experts, equipment and technology to many developing States parties through technical cooperation. Canada has NCAs in place with many developing countries. Cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment.
50	See Action 49 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation with developing countries.
51	See Action 38 for information on Canada's NCAs.
52	See Action 33 for information on Canada's contributions to the IAEA TCF.
53	Canada is continuing long-standing efforts to improve governance and management of the IAEA's TCF through Policy-Making Organs of the IAEA and relevant working groups. Despite some progress in recent years, additional work remains to be done in the areas of strategic management, outcome monitoring, which countries draw on the TCF and Member State payment of contributions to the TCF. Canada will continue to engage IAEA Member States to push for positive changes in these areas.
54	See Action 33 for information on Canada's contributions to the IAEA TCF. As of March 2015, Canada has contributed its voluntary funding to the TCF in full.
55	Canada supports the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), including by providing in-kind resources to PUI projects.
56	Canada is an active and regular contributor of support and expertise to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP). Canada has hosted fellowship participants and scientific visitors from the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe and hosted TCP meetings in the areas of nuclear safety and regulatory activities. Canadian lecturers and experts have contributed technical training in the areas of human health, agriculture and food security, water and the environment, energy, radiation technology and security and safety.
57	See Actions 24, 28 and 42 for information on CSAs, the Additional Protocol and CPPNM. The *Nuclear Energy Act* of 1985 (amended in 1997) relates to the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Canada. The *Nuclear Safety and Control Act* came into force in May 2000, replacing the *Atomic Energy Control Act*. It established the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) as the national regulator and set out its mandate, responsibilities and powers. These include domestically regulating the development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production, possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed information.

Action	*Steps Taken to Implement Commitments Since April 2014*
58	Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium fuel bank and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms based on their individual merits.
59	Canada ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in December 1995. Canada ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in January 1990. Canada ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in August 2002. Canada ratified Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 1998. See Actions 42 and 45 for information on the CPPNM and ICSANT.
60	In fall of 2014, Canada provided C$100,000 through its Global Partnership Program to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) Contribution Fund to assist the WINS Academy to continue its effort to create a high quality professional development training and certification programme in the field of nuclear security.
61	Under the auspices of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Canada has facilitated Jamaica's efforts to replace the core of their Slowpoke research reactor from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). Canadian expertise and experience was specifically needed to transform the LEU supplied by the US into a format suitable for use in the Slowpoke. At the 2014 the Nuclear Security Summit, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to the minimization of HEU when technologically and economically feasible. In that regard, Canada remains committed to eliminating the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes and intends to do so by 2016. Canada also continues to work toward the objective of repatriating its US-origin HEU fuel by 2018.
62	Canadian transport regulations for radioactive materials are based on the IAEA's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials.
63	Canada signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) in December 2013. On February 27, 2015, the *Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act* was enacted.
64	Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the 53rd IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the UN Charter, international law and the IAEA Statute.

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada*

1. At the sixty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly, Canada supported resolution 69/29 which called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In addition, Canada voted in favour of resolution 69/37 entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" which, inter alia, called on States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. It also recognized the endorsement by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of practical steps in a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution, including the convening of a conference, to be attended by all States of the region, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Canada voted against resolution 69/78 entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East". As expressed in Canada's explanation of vote, the resolution unfairly singled out Israel by calling for its accession to the NPT while failing to address serious nuclear non-compliance issues by States in the region, particularly Iran and Syria.

2. Canada is committed to advancing the outcomes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including a conference on a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East. Canada expresses its on-going support for the informal consultation process led by the Facilitator of the conference, Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, and the three convenors to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to arrive at modalities for a conference and ensure a successful conference to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Any WMD-free zone should be negotiated by States in the region for States in the region, with support from other actors as requested.

3. Canada has called for the universal and full adherence and compliance with the NPT by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application

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of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2014, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensus approach and because the resolution did not address serious breaches in compliance with NPT safeguards requirements by Iran and Syria, as determined by the IAEA and reported by the Agency to the UN Security Council. Canada has also worked with other States within the context of successive IAEA General Conferences to prevent unhelpful and politically-motivated resolutions from having a negative impact on efforts aimed at establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

4. Canada notes that, unfortunately, not all NPT States Party in the region have ratified a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA. Canada appeals to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding Additional Protocols to their respective CSAs, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to NPT Article III.

5. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Canada cosponsored resolution 69/81 at the sixty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly, and has also encouraged all states in the region, particularly those listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, to ratify the Treaty as a confidence and security building measure. Canadian technical experts participated as observers in the Integrated Field Exercise hosted by Jordan in November and December 2014 to test the CTBT Organization's on-site inspection capabilities. The exercise featured airborne radiation detection equipment contributed by Canada through its Global Partnership Program to the CTBT Organization in September 2013.

6. Canada shares the international community's serious concerns about the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's ongoing failure to meet its safeguards obligations. Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council through its two-decade-long history of concealing nuclear activities and facilities. In light of this track record, as well as Iran's failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports UN Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 1984, 2049, 2105, and 2159, and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions GOV/2003/69, GOV/2003/81, GOV/2004/21, GOV/2004/49, GOV/2004/79, GOV/2004/90, GOV/2005/64, GOV/2005/77, GOV/2006/14, GOV/2009/82, GOV/2011/69, and GOV/2012/50. These resolutions indicate clearly Iran's non-compliance with its legal safeguards obligations and express the international community's desire for a negotiated diplomatic solution, which verifiably ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

7. Iran is in non-compliance with its CSA and is in violation of six substantive UN Security Council resolutions and twelve IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Canada notes the IAEA's confirmation that Iran has so far implemented all of its required actions under the Joint Plan of Action but at the same time, Iran has failed to implement all of the practical measures it agreed to under the Framework for Cooperation. Canada firmly believes that a comprehensive solution will require all outstanding issues to be resolved. Iran continues to be the only State with a CSA in force that refuses to implement modified Code 3.1 provisions of its Subsidiary Arrangements, in violation of that CSA. Furthermore, Iran is required by binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council to take steps toward

the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement as well as its Additional Protocol. It has failed to do so. As such, the IAEA is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran or to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is being used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

8. Canada has previously made clear that for Iran to regain its place in the global community it must resolve all non-compliance issues. Chief among these are the possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear research outlined in the annex to the IAEA Director General's report of November 2011 (GOV/ 2011/65) — research which can only be understood in the context of a nuclear weapons development program. Iran must live up to its commitments to the IAEA under the Framework for Cooperation. Canada stresses that the Agency must clarify and confirm all information provided by Iran and that these measures should not be seen as static or fixed requirements, but rather elements in an on-going process intended to provide the Agency a complete understanding of Iran's nuclear program. In this regard, we expect Iran to cooperate fully, to answer all questions posed by the IAEA and to offer the IAEA access to any necessary sites, material or personnel.

9. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in Syria, and suggest nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea in contravention of the NPT. Canada fully supported the Board of Governors Resolution (GOV/2011/41) requesting the IAEA Director-General to report to the UN Security Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syria's safeguards obligations. While recognizing challenges posed by the current security situation in Syria, the IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the necessary cooperation needed to address Syria's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues", so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear program. Local authorities must be ready to provide access to the sites to which the Agency has requested. We also continue to urge Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. It is only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with the IAEA that Syria can restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear program.

10. Canada has called on all remaining States not party to the NPT to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the sixty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly which are referenced in paragraph one of this report.

11. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States Parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programs should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

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Towards a regional dialogue in the Middle East: an Israeli perspective

Submission by Israel

1. Israel's long-held vision of a more secure and peaceful Middle East requires that all regional States engage in a process of direct and sustained dialogue to address the broad range of regional security challenges in the Middle East. Such a dialogue, based on the widely accepted principle of consensus, can only emanate from within the region and address in an inclusive manner the threat perceptions of all regional parties with a view to enhancing and improving their security. Direct contact, combined with trust and confidence-building, is an essential basis for the creation of a new security paradigm in a region that is increasingly fraught with wars, conflicts, disintegration of national territories and human suffering.

2. Accordingly, Israel agreed in 2011 to the request of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Security Policy of Finland, Jaakko Laajava, to engage in consultations to advance a regional dialogue. Subsequently, Israel was the first country in the region to respond positively to Mr. Laajava's proposal in February 2013 to participate in multilateral consultations in Switzerland to discuss the arrangements and conditions necessary for convening a conference on establishing the Middle East as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. It took the Arab Group an additional eight months to agree to participate in the consultations.

3. Between October 2013 and June 2014, five rounds of multilateral consultations were held in Switzerland between Israel and several of its Arab neighbours. The central purpose of the meetings was to seek regional consensus on all the essential aspects of a conference in Helsinki, including the agenda, the concluding document and the necessary modalities. The consultations were conducted in a business-like manner and were the first direct engagement between Israel and its neighbours on this issue in more than 20 years, since the arms control and regional security process in the 1990s.

4. While not all regional States attended, the consultations presented an important opportunity for direct regional engagement. Indeed, Israel's participation at a senior and authoritative level in all the five meetings attested to the importance that Israel ascribed to the need to redefine a new regional security paradigm for the Middle East. During the consultations, Israel submitted, including in writing, some creative ideas and formulations that could advance consensus, as well as

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understandings and trust, between the regional parties. Indeed, Israel stated unequivocally, also in public, that, if agreement were reached on the agenda, the concluding document and terms of reference of a conference in Helsinki, the regional States could proceed to set a date for such an event.

5. In June 2014, the Arab representatives at the fifth round of consultations in Geneva felt that they required new instructions and in effect discontinued the talks. Since June 2014, Mr. Laajava has been attempting to convene a sixth round of consultations in Geneva. Israel responded positively on 20 October 2014 and 7 January 2015 to formal invitations in that regard. Despite Israel's positive attitude towards continued engagement, the sixth round of consultations in Geneva was postponed several times and was not held, preventing necessary progress towards a consensual agreement on a conference in Helsinki.

6. Regrettably, in recent years the Arab countries have preferred to focus their efforts on promoting contentious resolutions in the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference and the First Committee of the General Assembly. That negative approach has reinforced the lack of trust and confidence and prevented a meaningful dialogue between the States of the Middle East.

7. Ultimately, it is difficult to understand how any disarmament, arms control and regional security issues can be addressed without any direct dialogue between the regional States, as the Group of Arab States suggests. Such strident opposition to conducting a direct dialogue with Israel, coupled with the demand that a conference be convened by a deadline on the basis of terms of reference conceived by one side only, underlines and reinforces the mistrust and suspicion between the States in the region. If a serious regional effort has not emerged in the Middle East during the past five years it is not because of Israel.

8. It should be emphasized that notions of direct engagement and consensus are fundamental norms in international diplomacy and have been accepted in other regions. In that context, the Group of Seven recently declared that: "The regional parties must engage actively with each other in order to reach consensus on a date and an agenda for the Helsinki Conference as soon as possible. We emphasize that the Conference can only lead to a meaningful process if the interests of all participants are taken into account."

9. To promote any significant regional security architecture in the Middle East, it is imperative that the regional States do not adopt positions that prevent the other side from participating in what should be an inclusive regional process between all relevant stakeholders. Decisions that seek to circumvent and substitute direct engagement or the building of trust and agreement among regional parties will neither assist a regional process nor hasten a successful outcome.

10. A meaningful process will require:

(a) That regional States assume responsibility for the promotion of a direct regional dialogue, without external auspices that do not emanate from the region;

(b) That regional States address the broad range of security challenges facing the region;

(c) That all decisions be reached by consensus between the regional parties.

11. Israel, for its part, will continue to adopt a positive and constructive approach towards a meaningful regional discussion that could lead to a more peaceful and secure Middle East free from wars, conflicts and all weapons of mass destruction.

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Preparations for the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction*

Report by the facilitator

Appointment of the facilitator

1. In 1995, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) adopted a Resolution on the Middle East calling for, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Subsequently, the 2010 NPT Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

2. According to the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (henceforth *the conveners*), "in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States". The 2010 NPT Review Conference also agreed that "the 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution".

3. In accordance with the practical step endorsed by the 2010 Review Conference, on 14 October 2011, the conveners in consultation with the States of the region, appointed Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland as facilitator and designated Finland as the host Government for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

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4. Following the appointment of the facilitator and designation of the host Government, an office was established within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland in order to support the facilitator and assist in the preparations for the Conference.

The facilitator's mandate

5. The facilitator's mandate is to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator's mandate is also to assist implementation of follow-up steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

6. Accordingly, the facilitator has presented his reports to the three sessions of the Preparatory Committee (documents NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/10 and NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/18).

Consultations by the facilitator

7. In supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and undertaking preparations for the convening the of the 2012 Conference, the facilitator begun immediately in October 2011 fulfilling his mandate by gathering ideas, views and expectations of the regional States on the establishment of the zone and on the Conference in order to ensure their primary input into the process and to gain a full understanding of the various points of departure.

8. The facilitator adopted an inclusive approach in order to ensure that the views of all regional States were taken into account in the consultative process. In determining the list of regional parties to be consulted, the conveners and the facilitator have referred to the international Atomic Energy Agency document GC(XXXIII)/887, 29 August 1989, para 3 (Technical Study on Different Modalities of the Application of Safeguards in the Middle East). He has encouraged all States of the Middle East to adopt an open and forward-looking approach and to engage with each other in constructive dialogue and cooperation. The facilitator has throughout his tenure emphasized that while the international community, the conveners and the facilitator can provide important support, the ownership and the ultimate responsibility for a successful Conference and the establishment of the zone lies with the States of the region.

9. The facilitator and the staff of his office have carried out close to six hundred consultations and meetings in regional capitals and outside the region with all stakeholders, in particular the States of the region, the conveners of the Conference, the nuclear-weapon States, relevant international organizations, civil society and other interested parties. The focus of the consultations, bilateral or multilateral, has been with the States of the region.

10. Between October 2013 and June 2014 the facilitator together with the conveners of the Conference and with the participation of States of the region held five informal meetings in Glion and Geneva, Switzerland, in order to facilitate agreement among the States of the region on the arrangements for the Conference to be held in Helsinki. The meetings provided an opportunity to exchange views on the Conference and its preparations including discussions on the agenda, modalities and

rules of procedure. Participants contributed actively to the dialogue and presented proposals. The conveners and the facilitator were impressed by the participants' readiness to engage, by their wish to make progress and by their open and constructive approach.

11. Despite the efforts of the facilitator and the conveners in 2014 and 2015 to continue these informal meetings and move to the necessary drafting phase, it was not possible to convene a further meeting.

12. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference recognized the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, and encouraged all efforts in this regard. The facilitator and his team have participated in various events organized by civil society actors and have sought to actively engage with non-governmental organizations, academia and think tanks.

Preparations for the Conference

13. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review conference set the task of convening the Conference upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution. The conference is to be attended by all States of the Middle East. In determining the list of regional participants, the conveners and the facilitator have referred to the IAEA Document mentioned in paragraph 8 above.

14. As regards the time and venue, Finland as the host Government has announced that it is prepared to arrange the Conference in Helsinki on a short notice.

15. In May 2012, the facilitator's office presented to the States of the region non-papers on the different substantive and organizational aspects of the Conference in order to assist in identifying arrangements to be freely arrived at by them. Following input received, in October 2012, the facilitator circulated updated non-papers as his proposals for the Conference arrangements, including its agenda, modalities and rules of procedure. In his proposals, the facilitator sought to accommodate the different points of departure of the States of the regions as regards the Conference and the establishment of the zone.

16. In the course of the bilateral and multilateral consultations of the facilitator the States of the region have put forward both formally and informally written and oral proposals regarding the Conference arrangements. Tunisia submitted on 19 April 2013 on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States a working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.34) which included an Annex "The position of the Arab States regarding the non-paper prepared by the facilitator of 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction".

17. The facilitator's office produced in November 2014 "an orientation paper" which covers all main aspects of the arrangements for the Conference. It has been distributed to all future participants of the Conference as a tool of the facilitator that can be used during consultations in order to help move the process forward.

18. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference endorsed additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including that IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for

the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained. The facilitator requested said documentation from IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Each of these organizations provided the background documentation which was shared with the States of the region by the facilitator in December 2012.

Convening of the Conference

19. It was not possible to convene a Conference in 2012 as planned with the participation of all States of the region. Following the statements by the conveners stating this state of affairs, disappointment at the postponement of the Conference was widely expressed. Nevertheless, all States of the region expressed their willingness to continue the preparations for the Conference. The Government of Finland announced that it remained prepared to host the Conference once convened. The facilitator stated he would continue Conference preparations with the States of the region and the conveners.

20. The Government of Finland and the facilitator are grateful for the extensive support and cooperation they have been offered by all parties throughout the tenure of the facilitator. The Governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom have assisted financially the work of the facilitator. The Government of Switzerland has provided financial and logistical support to the organization of the informal meetings in Switzerland. The facilitator thanks these Governments for their valuable support.

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Actions 5, 20 and 21 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

Report submitted by the United States of America

As provided in the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Action Plan, the Governments of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," are working to implement Action 5 to "(f)urther enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence" and to make national reports on our Action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee under a common framework, consistent with Actions 20 and 21. Action 21 states "As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security." The framework we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it addresses all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20, to make similar reports.

Having provided our initial report to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, here we provide an update including actions in the past year for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Section I: Reporting on National Measures Relating to Disarmament

i. Nuclear Security Policies, Doctrine and Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear Policy

- U.S. policy is to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, in line with our NPT commitments. We are committed to pursuing a

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transparent step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, building on negotiated agreements and cooperative activities, so that we can continue to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures.

- The United States completed a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2010 that lays out our strategy for reducing the number and role of nuclear weapons in our defines posture. The new strategy makes clear the following.
  - The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons remains to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and partners.
  - The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
  - It is a global interest that the nearly 70-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.
  - U.S. policy is to maintain a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons, consistent with our current and future security requirements.
  - Nuclear plans must be consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, and will apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects.
  - We are working to establish conditions in which the United States can safely adopt a policy of making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons and continuing to strengthen conventional capabilities and missile defences as part of our broader efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
- Underscoring the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT, the United States strengthened its long-standing "negative security assurance" by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
- The United States has also made clear its readiness to provide negative security assurances within a legal framework through support for relevant Protocols to the existing five Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties.

Changes to Nuclear Force Posture and Alert Posture

- The new U.S. nuclear strategy outlined in the NPR builds on the significant reductions in our nuclear force posture taken since the end of the Cold War and aims to further limit the potential for accidental launch by enhancing the safety, security, and surety of the U.S. arsenal, while also maximizing the decision time available to the President in the event of a crisis.
- Actions and practices affecting the posture of U.S. nuclear forces include the following:
  - **As of June 16, 2014, the United States completed the reconfiguration** of all deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) so that each

missile only carries a single nuclear warhead (a process known as "de-MIRVing," whereby all independently targetable re-entry vehicles but one are removed). Reducing the concentration of deployed warheads increases stability by lowering possible incentives for others to launch a nuclear first strike;

- Continuing the practice of "open-ocean targeting" of all deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), such that in the extremely unlikely event of an accidental launch, the missile's payload would land in the open ocean;
- Continuing the practice of keeping all nuclear-capable bombers and dual-capable aircraft (DCA) off of day-to-day alert;
- Emphasizing the goal of maximized decision time for the President in the event of a crisis, including by making new investments in U.S. command and control systems; and,
- Directing the Defense Department to examine options to reduce the role of Launch Under Attack in U.S. nuclear planning, recognizing that the potential for a surprise, disarming nuclear attack is exceedingly remote.

Nuclear Weapons Surety

- **The United States recognizes that nuclear weapon systems require extraordinarily special consideration because of their destructive potential. In that regard, the United States takes a variety of measures to ensure that nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and under positive control — a concept we term "nuclear surety," which is an overriding national priority. This involves significant science and engineering efforts that draw on the lessons of the past and are aimed at preventing an accidental or inadvertent detonation, as illustrated below.**
  - **U.S. nuclear weapons incorporate safety design features that minimize the possibility of nuclear detonation due to accidents, errors, or acts of nature. Examples include the isolation of components essential to detonation from all forms of significant electrical energy, such as lightning or power surges, and fire-resistant pits.**
  - **Another safety feature of certain U.S. nuclear weapons designs is the use of insensitive high explosive (IHE) as opposed to conventional high explosive. IHE is much less sensitive to shock or heat and highly resistant to accidental detonation.**
  - **U.S. nuclear weapons apply additional measures to include the enhanced nuclear detonation safety concept to ensure that safety-critical components respond to abnormal environments in a predictably safe manner.**
    - **Abnormal environments include conditions that could occur in credible accidental or unusual situations, including an aircraft accident, lightning strike, shipboard fire, or a bullet, missile, or fragmentation strike.**

- **The United States has made public the safety design requirements under different environmental conditions (e.g., drop testing and fire safety design).**
- **U.S. "use control" design features preclude or delay unauthorized nuclear detonation through electronic and mechanical features. Examples include permissive action links, command disablement to render warheads inoperable, and active protection systems that disable critical warhead components when tampering is detected.**
- **U.S. nuclear weapons employ environmental sensing devices, such as accelerometers, contained in the arming circuit of a weapon providing both safety and control. This prevents inadvertent functioning of the circuit until the weapon is launched or released and experiences environmental parameters specific to its particular delivery system.**
- **The stockpile is assessed annually to ensure that safety and use control devices and components meet requirements and are performing effectively. Surety requirements are addressed during all phases of the nuclear weapon life cycle.**

ii. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification

Nuclear Weapons Reductions

- The United States continues a decades-long, step-by-step effort to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. We have reduced our nuclear weapons stockpile by approximately 85 percent since its Cold War peak, or about an 82 percent reduction since 1970, when the NPT entered into force.
- A major step along this path is the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, which when fully implemented by February 2018 will cap U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads at 1,550, the lowest levels of these weapons since the late 1950s.
  - On April 8, 2014, the United States announced the future composition of the U.S. nuclear force structure in order to comply with the Treaty's limits by 2018. The updated strategic force structure will require reductions in all three legs of the U.S. nuclear Triad. **Specifically, 50 ICBMs will be removed from their silos, four launch tubes on each of the 14 strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN's) will be rendered incapable of launching an SLBM, and 30 B-52 heavy bombers will be converted verifiably to a conventional only role.** These actions will result in no more than 1,550 warheads deployed on:
    - 400 deployed ICBMs;
    - 240 deployed SLBMs on 14 SSBNs; and,
    - 60 deployed nuclear-capable bombers.
  - **As of March 1, 2015, the number of U.S. deployed strategic warheads under the New START Treaty was 1,597 on 785 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.**

- As President Obama stated in Berlin in 2013, the United States is prepared to negotiate further nuclear reductions with Russia of up to one-third in the deployed strategic warhead levels established in the New START Treaty.
- The United States remains open to seeking negotiated reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons — strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.
- These actions extend the legacy of U.S. leadership on nuclear arms control and disarmament, which includes many other signal achievements.
  - *The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* eliminated all U.S. and Soviet Union ground-launched missiles with a maximum range between 500 and 5,500 km and permanently prohibited the parties from possessing, producing, or flight-testing those missiles, and from possessing or producing launchers of such missiles. The Treaty is of unlimited duration.
    - All U.S. ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) were eliminated by 1991, to include 403 Pershing IA and IB and Pershing II GLBMS and 443 Tomahawk GLCMS — 846 total missiles.
  - *The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)*, the most sweeping and complex arms control agreement negotiated in history, limited U.S. and Russian attributed strategic nuclear warheads to 6,000 on no more than 1,600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
    - Between September 1990 and July 2009, the United States under START reduced the number of deployed strategic launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers in its arsenal) from 2,246 to 1,188, a 47 percent reduction, and nuclear warheads attributed to these launchers from 10,563 to 5,916, a 44 percent reduction.
  - *The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (or Moscow Treaty)* limited the United States and Russia to no more than 1,700 to 2,220 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) by 2012.
    - The U.S. aggregate number of ODSNW was 1,944 as of February 2011, when the Treaty was superseded by the New START Treaty.
  - *National Measures*: In addition to treaty-based reductions, the United States has made dramatic and deep cuts to its Cold War arsenal, including through the 1991 and 1992 "Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)," which eliminated approximately 3,000 U.S. nuclear weapons and resulted in an approximately 90 percent reduction in all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. These national measures included the following:
    - Elimination of all 450 Minuteman II ICBM silo launchers and all 50 Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers, as well as 50 Minuteman III silo launchers;
    - Removal of four SSBNs from strategic (nuclear) service and reducing the number of warheads on each of the remaining deployed submarines;

- Retiring all FB-111A bombers, eliminating all B-52G heavy bombers, and converting all B-1B heavy bombers to conventional-only capability;
- Withdrawal to the United States of all ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons with a range less than 300 miles;
- Elimination of all U.S. nuclear artillery shells and warheads for short-range ballistic missiles;
- Removal of tactical nuclear weapons from all naval combatant vessels;
- Removal of all nuclear command and control aircraft from constant airborne alert; and
- Retiring the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile and the AGM-69 Short-Range Attack Missile (both air-to-ground missiles).

U.S. Nuclear Stockpile Transparency

- At the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States released for the first time its nuclear stockpile totals, detailing annual stockpile levels from 1962 to 2009 and annual totals of nuclear weapons dismantled from 1994 to 2009.
- **Today, the United States has the smallest stockpile since 1956.**
- The United States has retired many thousands of nuclear warheads. Retired warheads have been removed from their delivery platform, are not functional, and are in the queue for dismantlement.
- **The United States declassified and reported its nuclear warhead stockpile in 2010 and 2014.**
- **In 2015, the United States again declassified its nuclear stockpile data through the end of fiscal year 2014. As of September 30, 2014, the total stockpile of active and inactive nuclear warheads was 4,717.**
- **An additional 299 warheads have been dismantled since September 30, 2013, with a total of 10,251 warheads dismantled between 1994 and 2014.**
- **In 2015, the United States reported that approximately 2,500 warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement.**
- These actions have resulted in about an 85 percent reduction in total nuclear weapons in our stockpile since the height of the Cold War, or about 82 percent reduction since 1970 when the NPT entered into force.
- Since 1992, the United States has retired and dismantled 12 nuclear weapon types, including the most recent types: the W79, W62, W56, and the B53.
- The last W80-0 warhead for the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Navy (TLAM-N) was retired from service and has been dismantled.
- **The United States announced in April 2015 that President Obama will seek funding to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent.**

- It is U.S. policy not to develop new nuclear weapons. Life extension programs for remaining nuclear warheads will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities for nuclear weapons.
  - **Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programs to replace aging infrastructure and extend the life of existing warheads can enable further nuclear reductions while maintaining a credible deterrent.**
  - **These activities advance U.S. planning for implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which the United States has signed and intends to ratify.**
  - **The "3+2" strategy consolidates nuclear weapon types from twelve to five, including consolidating from four variants of the B61 gravity bomb into one (B61-12), allowing the B83, the last megaton-class weapon in the U.S. arsenal, to be retired, and reducing the number of bombs by a factor of two.**

Fissile Material Reductions and Facility Consolidation

- In addition to information on the nuclear weapon stockpile, the United States has made public the total amounts of U.S. plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) produced by the weapons program for military or non-military use.
- In 2009, the United States reported the plutonium inventory was 95.4 metric tons (MT). In 1994 and 2007, the United States declared 61.5 MT of plutonium as excess and removed from further use as fissile material for use in nuclear warheads.
- The U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) requires the United States and Russia each to dispose of no less than 34 MT of weapon-grade plutonium each country has declared excess to defense needs. The United States remains committed to the PMDA and to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) role in verifying both sides' disposition programs under this agreement.
- **Implementation of the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement is ongoing. Under this agreement all weapon-grade plutonium produced since 1995 by these now-shutdown reactors remains outside of military programs, and the reactors are under bilateral monitoring.**
- The total U.S. HEU inventory as of 2004 was 686.6 MT. In declarations in 1994 and 2005, the United States declared that a significant portion of that inventory totalling 374 MT of HEU would be removed from further use as fissile material in nuclear warheads.
  - To date, the United States has down-blended a total of more than **146** metric tons of HEU from these declarations — enough material for more than **5,800** nuclear weapons. The total amount of down-blended HEU will continue to increase as the current down-blending effort for additional material progresses. **Down-blending removes this material from further use as fissile material in nuclear warheads.**
    - 17.4 MT of this HEU was down-blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU) in facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards under the Voluntary

Offer Agreement for use in the American Assured Fuel Supply, a U.S. swords-to-ploughshares initiative that provides back-up LEU fuel assurances to U.S. partners in the event of a disruption in supply.

- In total, **the United States has down-blended more than 50 MT of excess HEU to LEU under IAEA monitoring**. The cost for this monitoring was covered in full by the United States.

- Up to 160 MT of the excess HEU will be provided for use in naval ship power propulsion, postponing the need for production of new HEU or construction of a new HEU enrichment facility for many decades.

- In the most important nuclear non-proliferation achievements of the post-Cold War period, the United States and Russia successfully completed the major non-proliferation, peaceful use, and disarmament goals of the 1993 United States-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. Under this landmark Agreement, 500 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU was converted to LEU and shipped to the United States where it was used for peaceful purposes as fuel in American nuclear power reactors.

  - This Agreement eliminated approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads equivalent of Russian, weapons-origin HEU, with the resulting downblended LEU used to produce half of all nuclear energy generated annually in the United States for the ten year period from 2003-2013. **Approximately ten percent of all electricity produced in the United States during this period came directly from the nuclear fuel from the elimination of former Soviet nuclear warheads.**

  - **The amount of nuclear material downblended under the HEU Purchase Agreement was equivalent to roughly three warheads worth of HEU per day for most of the last two decades.**

  - During the 20-year Agreement, both countries exercised reciprocal transparency monitoring in their respective nuclear facilities to ensure that all HEU processed in Russia was of weapons-origin and that all LEU produced from that material was used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the United States.

- In parallel to reductions in the U.S. stockpile, the United States has consolidated the number of sites needed to maintain it. Today's current nuclear complex is smaller and geared to support not only our enduring nuclear weapons stockpile through science-based stewardship, but also our capability to address proliferation, terrorism, and other global threats.

- In 1980, the nuclear complex was made up of 14 sites. Today, it consists of eight, and its workforce has been reduced by two-thirds since the end of the Cold War.

- **From a high point of approximately 10,600 square kilometres in the early 1980s, the size of the complex has shrunk to approximately half its original size, 5,600 square km.**

- Key actions to reduce the complex include the following:

- Cessation of production of plutonium for weapons in 1987 and closure of all plutonium production reactors at the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington, and at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina;
- Closure and decommissioning of the Hanford Site nuclear reprocessing plants;
- Cessation of production of HEU for weapons in 1964 and shutdown of the K-25 enrichment complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
- Conversion of enrichment plants in Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, to support civil nuclear fuel production only;
- Closure and decommissioning of the Feed Materials Production Center at Fernald, Ohio, the Rocky Flats plutonium pit production facility in Colorado, and the Mound and Pinellas plants for nuclear weapons components in Miamisburg, Ohio, and Pinellas, Florida;
- Removal of Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), quantities large enough to construct nuclear devices, from Sandia National Laboratories, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Technical Areas 3 and 18 at Los Alamos National Laboratory, as well as consolidation of Category I/II material into TA-55 at Los Alamos;
- Consolidation of HEU storage into the newly constructed HEU Materials Facility at Y-12 in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and
- Consolidation of non-pit plutonium into the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility at the Savannah River Site.

- The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992. The former Nevada Test Site has been re-named the Nevada National Security Site and today supports an expanded mission to include stockpile stewardship but also a range of activities supporting research and development of technologies to support non-proliferation goals.
- Looking forward, the new U.S. nuclear strategy anticipates shifting from retaining large numbers of non-deployed nuclear warheads towards a more responsive infrastructure over time. We are investing in a more modern physical infrastructure that would allow for further reductions in total nuclear forces.

Multilateral Arms Control

- The United States reaffirms its commitment to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, also known as Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
- As an interim step, the United States actively participated in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that will make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to an FMCT. We are hopeful that this two-year GGE, which first convened in Geneva in March 2014, will serve to motivate and revitalize work on FMCT and progress within the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

- The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in the security interest of every nation, and the United States remains committed to ratifying the CTBT and bringing it into force.
- The United States makes the largest annual financial contribution to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, paying more than 22 percent of the Commission's annual budget. With U.S. assistance, **as of December 31, 2014**, the **total number of certified International Monitoring System (IMS) stations and radionuclide laboratories completed was 281. This amounts to 83 percent of the total network.**
- The United States is helping to develop the on-site inspection (OSI) element of the CTBT's verification regime. Through significant U.S. voluntary contributions-in-kind of equipment, expertise, and research, the United States **played a major role in supporting** the largest ever on-site inspection Integrated Field Exercise conducted in Jordan in December 2014.
- Through 2015, the United States, along with the rest of the P5, convened a series of meetings of technical experts to discuss and identify areas for future P5 collaboration on CTBT-related issues.

Verification, Including Research and Development

- Effective verification is an essential condition for non-proliferation, arms control and achieving a world without nuclear weapons. Verification methods and technologies capable of detecting violations and monitoring compliance must be in place as states move step-by-step toward nuclear disarmament.
- Transparency through information sharing and confidence-building measures contribute to stability and security by enhancing predictability and building trust and confidence.
- Verification under the New START Treaty increases stability and predictability between the world's largest nuclear powers. The Treaty's robust and extensive verification provisions provide mutual confidence that both sides are living up to their obligations. The accurate and timely information shared between the United States and Russia on each side's respective nuclear forces diminishes the risks of misunderstanding and misperception. The Treaty's verification regime includes the following:
  - 18 short-notice on-site inspections of both deployed and non-deployed nuclear ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers each year for each party that are more intrusive than those conducted under the previous START agreement, allowing each party to confirm the actual number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs or nuclear armaments on heavy bombers;
  - **Additional exhibitions and demonstrations of certain items subject to the Treaty;**
  - National technical means to improve verification effectiveness; and,
  - An extensive system of notifications to inform the other party when changes occur to the Treaty's database, such as movements, flight tests, and deployments of Treaty-accountable items. As of April **2015**, the

United States and Russia have exchanged over **8,300** such notifications through their respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington, D.C., and Moscow.

- To date, more than **150** on-site inspections have been conducted by the United States and Russia under the New START Treaty. Treaty on-site inspections and other verification measures enable each side to maintain confidence in the validity of data exchanged by the United States and Russia.
- Looking to the future and in keeping with our NPT commitments, the United States is supporting a range of research and development (R&D) activities, expanding our work on verification technologies needed for future agreements. We are making multi-million dollar investments each year to advance these capabilities.
- **The United States launched a new initiative — the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification — to bring together nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states to address future nuclear disarmament verification challenges. A kick-off meeting was held in Washington, D.C. on March 19-20, involving participants from 28 states, the European Union, and the Holy See.**
- **Goals of the International Partnership are to assess and potentially develop approaches addressing monitoring and verification challenges across the nuclear weapons lifecycle — including material production and control, warhead production, deployment, storage, dismantlement, and disposition. The Partnership will build on lessons learned from efforts such as the U.S.-UK Technical Cooperation Program and the UK-Norway Initiative. The U.S. Government will work with the Nuclear Threat Initiative through an official public-private partnership.**
- **Since 2000, the United States and United Kingdom have engaged in an extensive program of cooperation under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement to develop and evaluate methodologies and technologies required to verify future nuclear weapon reduction initiatives. This work includes:**
  - **evaluating managed-access procedures at nuclear weapons facilities;**
  - **developing procedures to confirm declared nuclear weapon attributes;**
  - **examining the chain of custody for nuclear weapons and components;**
  - **evaluating the monitored storage of nuclear weapons, components, and materials;**
  - **developing procedures for the authentication of inspection equipment; and,**
  - **enabling the testing of technology in operational environments.**
- Through our work with the UK and other partners, U.S. verification research initiatives develop capabilities to address major technical challenges, such as monitoring of warheads, including non-deployed warheads in storage, as well as capabilities to distinguish warheads by type.
  - The United States is conducting a nuclear warhead modelling and measurement campaign to establish a comprehensive nuclear warhead

and component signature set. The resulting data will support assessment of sensitive information that could be revealed as a result of future treaty verification activities, and will further guide future R&D in the areas of radiation detection and information protection.

- The United States is conducting field demonstrations and evaluations of nuclear warhead lifecycle "end-to-end" monitoring capabilities, to include warhead storage and transportation monitoring demonstrations and evaluations at the Nevada National Security Site. Technologies are being developed and assessed to provide assurance to a potential monitoring party that nuclear warheads are accounted for and tracked throughout their lifecycle, including during long-term storage and dismantlement.
- **In a major effort through 2018 with the Department of Energy's National Laboratories, the United States will examine procedures and technology required for the monitored dismantlement of nuclear weapons, building on a three-year chain-of-custody project that culminated in demonstration experiments in January 2014, which:**
  - **developed a representative environment for testing and evaluating technology research and development (R&D) of chain-of-custody technologies and carried out a series of technical evaluations; and,**
  - **developed technologies to support accountability of warheads including evaluating the potential feasibility of a real-time system for counting items of inspection using radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags and tested its potential use in an inspection scenario.**

- The United States is also pursuing R&D to enhance other future arms control treaties, including:
  - technologies to support the CTBT, including completion of field experiments and demonstrations to further our understanding of underground nuclear event seismic signatures;
  - activities evaluating CTBT-related technologies for effectiveness and intrusiveness, optimizing visual observation, seismic and acoustic sensing, multi-spectral imaging, and radionuclide transport and measurement; and,
  - development of monitoring capabilities for defined fissile material production facilities and for possible inspections at sensitive U.S. sites.

iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

- **In March 2015, the United States hosted a visit to the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories for representatives from 11 NPT non-nuclear weapon States Parties and the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs. The visit included briefings, tours, and exchanges on U.S. stockpile stewardship and management activities, and the role played by the national laboratories in support of the President's arms control and non-proliferation agenda.**

The P5 Conference Process

- The United States is committed to engaging its P5 partners to advance all aspects of the NPT. P5 activities are an essential means for laying the foundation for future agreements that could involve parties beyond the United States and Russia.
- The P5 are pursuing regular dialogue on nuclear weapons-related issues to an extent unseen in prior years. The United Kingdom hosted the sixth P5 Conference in London in February 2015, following the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, 2012 Washington, 2013 (Russia-hosted) Geneva, and 2014 Beijing Conferences. Each Conference has built on the success of the last and an increasing amount of P5 intersessional work.
- At these Conferences the P5 have exchanged views on their nuclear doctrines, strategic stability, and international security from their individual country perspectives to gain better understanding and build strategic trust.
- **The United States and Russian Federation have briefed the other P5 states on their nuclear arms control verification and notification experience to foster greater familiarity with practical arrangements that promote the irreversibility, transparency, and verifiability of the disarmament process.**
- The United States participated in the P5 Working Group to create a "Glossary of Definitions of Key Nuclear Terms" chaired by China. The group will **release a first edition of the glossary at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. At the London P5 Conference in February 2015, the P5 noted their intention to revise and update the Glossary in the future.** This work substantially contributes to NPT goals by improving mutual understanding of key arms control and non-proliferation concepts and can help lay the groundwork for eventual nuclear negotiations that involve all five states.
- **U.S. experts are working with P5 counterparts to review P5 collaboration on improving and maintaining the CTBT verification regime and to identify ways our unique experience can contribute to further strengthening the CTBT monitoring regime.**
- **The United States hosted a CTBT-related workshop, with participation by all P5 states, on data quality objectives for On-Site Inspection equipment.**
- **The P5 released a statement in February 2015 encouraging states to undertake efforts to minimize the impact of xenon gas released into the environment from medical isotope production on the CTBT's International Monitoring System.**
- The United States hosted France and the United Kingdom for a transparency visit to the Nevada National Security Site (the former Nevada Test Site) in 2013. The United States and United Kingdom also briefed our P5 partners on cooperative work developing verification procedures and technologies.
- P5 engagement is a long-term investment in strengthening the NPT, building trust, and creating a stronger foundation for the work required to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. **We will continue working to advance P5 engagement, particularly on verification work, building on past**

experience and the need to address difficult challenges we will face in monitoring future agreements.

Other Confidence-Building Measures and Agreements

- *The Direct Secure Communication System*, also known as the "Hotline," is an emergency and non-emergency secure communication system intended for use by the highest leadership of the United States and Russia (since 1963) and with China (since 1998). The system is maintained by each government to ensure that leaders are prepared to manage the full range of national security crises we face internationally.

- *The U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC)*, **located in the Department of State, provides the U.S. Government with 24-hour, seven-day-a-week, direct government-to-government communications in support of fourteen international, agreements, treaties, and arrangements on nuclear, conventional, chemical and cyber issues, with the four nuclear state successors to the Soviet Union, the over 50 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The NRRC processes approximately 14,000 notifications annually, providing translations for notifications in five languages, with the capacity to add additional countries and languages at need.**

- *The Accidents Measures Agreement* (Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) *and the Agreement on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link* (with Annex, Supplementing and Modifying the Memorandum of Understanding with Annex, of June 20, 1963) were signed and entered into force in 1971, inter alia, to provide for certain immediate or advance notification and to facilitate urgent communications via the "Hotline."

- *The Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement (Agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launcher Ballistic Missiles) (BMLNA)* was signed in 1988. Pursuant to this Agreement, the United States and Russia agreed to provide each other with notifications, no less than 24 hours in advance, of dates, launch areas, and impact sites for any test launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Notifications of launches under the New START Treaty are provided in accordance with the BMLNA.

- *The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)* was adopted at a November 2002 conference by 93 countries in The Hague. Under the Code's voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures, the United States politically commits to provide pre-launch notification of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles (the NRRC assists in the notification process), as well as submits annual declarations of our space and ballistic missile policies.

- *The U.S.-Russia Presidential Declaration on Mutual Detargeting*, issued in January 1994, announced the commitment of both sides to ensure that, by May 1994, the United States and Russia no longer had ICBMs and SLBMs targeting

each other. In the highly unlikely event of an accidental launch of a U.S. nuclear weapon, the weapon would land in the open ocean.

iv. Other Related Issues

Examples of Resources Devoted to Disarmament Treaty Implementation, Inspections, and Dismantlement

- The United States expends considerable resources in fulfilment of its commitments under the many disarmament and arms control agreements and arrangements that it has implemented.
- The United States is committed to funding nuclear weapons dismantlement, and plans to dismantle all nuclear weapons retired prior to 2009 no later than the end of Fiscal Year 2022. **This dismantlement plan is currently 10% ahead of schedule. The United States announced in April 2015 that President Obama will seek funding to accelerate dismantlement of retired U.S. nuclear warheads by 20 percent.** The United States has spent over **$225** million on weapons dismantlement in the past five years.
- Transitioning the deployed nuclear force structure to meet the 2018 limits of the New START Treaty is expected to cost $300 million from fiscal years 2014 to 2018.
  - **During calendar year 2014, the United States eliminated 52 ICBM silos for the Minuteman III and one for the Peacekeeper, completing the elimination of 103 ICBM silos to date under the New START Treaty. The cost of these eliminations alone was approximately $20 million. The United States also hosted 18 inspections.**
  - In addition, the United States **continued** the conversion process to render inoperative some launchers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles on U.S. submarines. **The cost of these conversions exceeded $50 million in 2014.**
- **In 2014, the U.S. Air Force spent $147.7 million on verification of foreign compliance with nuclear arms control and non-proliferation treaties.**
- **Since 2000, the United States has spent approximately $40 million on cooperative work with the United Kingdom to evaluate methodologies and technologies required to verify future nuclear weapon reductions; the United Kingdom contributed a commensurate sum.**
- **Since 2011, the United States has spent $60 million on the National Nuclear Security Administration's work with its National Laboratories to look at procedures and technologies required for the monitored dismantlement of nuclear weapons.**
- The United States continues to make substantial investments in R&D to support future nuclear arms control agreements and requirements. In **2014**, the U.S. **National Nuclear Security Administration and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency funded over $191 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation of arms control verification technology.**
- **The United States spent $380 million on the surety of U.S. nuclear weapons from 2010-2015.**

- The United States makes the largest annual financial contribution to the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, paying more than 22 percent of the Commission's annual budget.
    - From 1996 through **2014**, the United States has contributed over **$377 million** through its annual assessment.
    - Since 2011, the United States has funded over $23 million of contributions-in-kind projects to the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to accelerate the development of the verification regime and to improve its capabilities.
    - The United States has contributed another $25.5 million to rebuild the Crozet Island hydroacoustic station of the IMS.
- **In 2014, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's enacted budget was $567 million for the safe and secure storage and handling and disposition of surplus fissile material, including construction of disposition facilities.**

Section II: Reporting on National Measures Relating to Non-proliferation

i. Safeguards

- The United States laid out a broad agenda to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in 2009. In addition to nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the agenda includes measures to strengthen the NPT and IAEA safeguards as a basis for cooperation and confront the threat of nuclear terrorism both in the United States and other countries.
- **In 2008, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop the policies, concepts, technologies, expertise and infrastructure necessary to strengthen and sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to meet new challenges. NGSI has focused on renewing U.S. capabilities to support international safeguards, and is intended to serve as a catalyst for a broader international commitment to support international safeguards. In 2015, NGSI has a budget of approximately $50M.**

U.S. Safeguards

- **Before the NPT and the Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) entered into force, the United Sates pioneered IAEA on-site inspections at select U.S. nuclear facilities during the 1960s.**
- The United States brought into force a safeguards agreement in 1980 (also known as the U.S. Voluntary Offer Agreement — VOA) and Additional Protocol (AP) in 2009. These agreements contain the standard provisions for safeguards implementation and demonstrate our readiness to accept safeguards on civil nuclear activities.

- The United States has made eligible for IAEA safeguards nearly 300 civil nuclear facilities, including power reactors, research reactors, commercial fuel fabrication plants, uranium enrichment plants, and other types of facilities. This list of U.S. nuclear facilities that are eligible for IAEA inspections is routinely updated and provided to the IAEA.
- Additionally, the United States has made three fuel fabrication facilities and one enrichment facility available for IAEA inspections to verify declared facility design information (and changes to the design) under the Reporting Protocol to the VOA.

• The United States has hosted over **800 IAEA inspections** conducted at facilities on this U.S. list. Since 1994, this includes **more than 600 IAEA inspections** at five U.S. facilities containing material removed permanently from weapons programs. The United States covered the costs for such inspections through the U.S. voluntary contribution to the IAEA.

- This includes nearly three metric tons of plutonium declared excess to weapons under IAEA safeguards at the KAMS Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. KAMS is the first plutonium storage facility in the world to implement remote monitoring, which enabled the IAEA to expand and develop remote monitoring techniques that will be useful in other facilities worldwide.

• The United States accepted all provisions of the IAEA's Model Additional Protocol, excluding only instances where its application would result in access by the IAEA to activities with direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities.

- The United States reported 264 locations and activities in the U.S. initial declaration under the AP in 2009. The United States has transmitted an updated annual declaration to the IAEA each year since, with more than three hundred declarations in each subsequent year.
- The United States hosted two complementary access visits from the IAEA under the U.S. Additional Protocol in 2010. These were the first such visits conducted in the territory of an NPT nuclear weapon state.
- The United States has also made regular reports to the IAEA of the export of items enumerated in Annex II of the U.S. Additional Protocol.

Multilateral Safeguards Support

• Since 1977, the United States has provided new tools, technology, experts and other resources to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation through the United States Support Program (USSP) to IAEA Safeguards.

• Since 2010, the United States has **pledged $182 million** in extra-budgetary funding for IAEA safeguards work, above and beyond our contribution to the IAEA regular budget.

- Since 2010, this funding has supported initiation of over 125 new tasks through the USSP, promoting the strengthening of safeguards through direct and in-kind support to the IAEA, including **providing over 35 staff**

in the form of Junior Professional Officers and Cost Free Experts, over 50 training courses and workshops, and supported the procurement of nearly 20 different safeguards equipment systems. We have also developed and transferred numerous safeguards technologies to international partners, including the IAEA.

- Since 2010, the United States has provided **almost $28 million** in extrabudgetary funds to upgrade the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratories.
- **A recent example of a technology that the United States developed and transferred to the IAEA is the Remote Monitoring Sealing Array (RMSA). The RMSA enables the IAEA to remotely monitor storage of some types of nuclear material and the IAEA has approved the RMSA for safeguards use. The IAEA currently uses an earlier version of the RMSA at the KAMS facility and it has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of inspections at KAMS.**

Bilateral Safeguards Support

- The United States has engaged **nearly 50 countries** to improve safeguards infrastructure, to include best practices and training workshops on Additional Protocol implementation, strengthening State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, quality management, non-destructive assay, and safeguards regulatory development. Through these and other workshops, the United States has trained **more than 2,800 foreign practitioners** in safeguards since 2007.
  - Since 2010, the United States has held **more than 90 training courses and workshops** on safeguards implementation for countries in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South America. Recent examples include:
    - **An international workshop at Argonne National Laboratory in August 2014 to address issues facing countries preparing to bring the Additional Protocol into force and develop processes for effective implementation; and**
    - **A regional workshop in Kenya in March 2015 for the development of safeguards-related regulatory documents.**
  - **The United States cooperates with countries with advanced fuel cycle facilities to provide technical expertise for developing instrumentation and systems to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation. The United States works with international partners to test newly developed safeguards equipment.**
  - **NGSI has concluded over 240 projects with international partners and has deployed over 40 customized or new safeguards technologies in partner countries.**

Safeguards Education and Training

- Through the NGSI, the United States seeks to recruit, educate, train, and retain a new generation of international safeguards specialists for positions in the United States and at the IAEA. This initiative has expanded safeguards education and training opportunities through a variety of mechanisms:
  - Developed non-proliferation university curriculum at over a dozen universities;
  - Sponsored Laboratory internships, graduate and post-graduate research and fellowship opportunities;
  - Published a nuclear safeguards textbook available for free download; and
  - Developed and sponsored six annual short courses on safeguards and non-proliferation topics.
  - To date, **over 1000 students and young professionals** have completed NGSI safeguards courses and approximately 350 have participated in NGSI-funded internships.
    - **More than half of NGSI's post-graduate alumni have gone on to staff positions at the IAEA or U.S. National Laboratories.**

ii. Export Controls

- The United States maintains a rigorous and comprehensive system for nuclear export controls and has worked for years to strengthen international nuclear export control regimes and assist states in implementing regime requirements. Export controls are a tool to facilitate commerce by providing assurances to suppliers that exported equipment is used for peaceful purposes.
- Through Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bodies, including the Consultative Group and the Technical Experts Group, the United States continues to work to update NSG lists and guidelines to conform to the evolving nature of proliferation and nuclear trade.
- The United States updated U.S. regulations related to export control of nuclear material, nuclear equipment and dual-use items following the Fundamental Review of the NSG control lists completed in 2013.
- The United States also continues to support export control and related border security training and assistance programs worldwide. **The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program is the U.S. Government's premier initiative to help partner countries improve their strategic trade control and related border security systems, implemented through various U.S. Government agencies and other organizations. Each year the EXBS Program carries out numerous outreach and capacity-building activities across the globe in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing accumulations of advanced conventional weapons. Since the last NPT Review Conference, the EXBS Program has completed over 1,700 activities including:**

- **Donating approximately $45 million in state-of-the art detection, inspection, and interdiction equipment to our program partners to enhance their radiation detection and border protection capabilities;**
- **Training for over 7,500 partner country officials in the development of enforcement techniques and capabilities, including mechanisms for targeting, detection, inspection, and disposal of proliferation-relevant cargo, as well as specialized training for border control and enforcement agencies, such as commodity identification and detection and interdiction techniques at air, land, sea, and rail environments;**
- **Providing over 50 legal and regulatory workshops, consultations with subject matter experts, and regional seminars to develop export control frameworks that conform to international standards for regulating trade in items on the control lists of the multilateral export control regimes and help meet their obligations pursuant to important U.S. and international initiatives, including UN Security Council resolution 1540; and**
- **Sponsoring several regional and international conferences bringing policymakers and technical experts together to share best practices and to strengthen national strategic trade control systems, including most recently the 14th International Export Control Conference in the United Arab Emirates in March 2014, which included 313 participants from 74 different countries. Panels included discussions about proliferation threats and challenges, methods to manage scarce resources, the need to preserve a safe and open trading system, and strategies to enhance information-sharing. EXBS also sponsored the 16th Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group in Kyiv, Ukraine in June 2011.**

iii. Nuclear Security

- Nuclear terrorism represents the most immediate and extreme threat to global security, requiring a strong and enduring commitment to domestic and worldwide action. The United States continues to apply new approaches and learn from the experience of others in order to remain ahead of an evolving threat environment.

Multilateral Nuclear Security Efforts

- The United States launched the Nuclear Security Summit process with President Obama's Prague Speech in 2009. This head-of-state level forum first met in 2010 in Washington, with subsequent Summits in Seoul in 2012 and The Hague in 2014. President Obama will host a fourth Summit in the United States in 2016. The Summits have raised awareness on the importance of nuclear security worldwide, and have resulted in efforts to (1) reduce the amount of dangerous nuclear material globally, (2) improve security of nuclear material and radioactive sources, and 3) improve international cooperation to reduce the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.

- The Summit process has elicited dozens of national and multilateral commitments and tangible results that have enhanced nuclear security, as well as led to expanded multilateral and bilateral cooperation on nuclear security with dozens of countries worldwide. Together we have:
  - Established a global network of senior level experts working on nuclear security in 53 governments and 4 international organizations;
  - Removed and disposed of approximately 3 metric tons of vulnerable Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium;
  - Completely eliminated HEU and separated plutonium within the borders of eleven countries and Taiwan;
  - Successfully converted 24 HEU nuclear reactors in 14 countries to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel use or verified those reactors as shut down;
  - Garnered the commitment of 125 countries to follow the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources;
  - **Helped secure 218 buildings in 5 countries storing weapons-usable nuclear materials through physical security upgrades;**
  - Equipped **over 550 international sites with radiation detection systems** and provided **over 76 mobile radiation detection vans** to partner countries to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological material;
  - **Requested international advisory reviews of nuclear related activities by the IAEA to assist 13 other countries that did so since the first Summit; and**
  - **Taken steps to build national capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling, including increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts to investigate nuclear smuggling networks, increased use of radiation detection systems both at and inside national borders, and increased nuclear forensics capabilities and legal training to in twenty countries to ensure conviction of criminals arrested for smuggling these dangerous materials.**
- Additionally, the United States is the largest national contributor to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund. Since 2010, the United States has provided **approximately $59 million**, which has supported:
  - Cost Free Experts, Junior Professional Officers and consultants providing important expertise and support in specific fields in the form of supplemental staff;
  - Advisory services (missions and technical visits) to IAEA Member States to establish the necessary infrastructure to protect nuclear and other radioactive materials from theft and diversion, protect nuclear installations and transport against sabotage and other malicious acts, and to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials;
  - Development of Nuclear Security Series guidance documents; dissemination of concepts and procedures for dealing effectively with

nuclear and radiological threats through international conferences, training courses, seminars, and workshops;

- The IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database, which facilitates the exchange of authoritative information on incidents among States, and is an asset helping participating States and selected international organizations to share information on nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control;
- 50 IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions in other countries since 1996 and helped revise the IPPAS Guidelines to be consistent with current international standards; and
- IAEA Assistance to Member States in the development of an infrastructure, including equipment, for the implementation of nuclear security at major public events, such as sports or political gatherings.

Bilateral Nuclear Security Efforts

- The United States is committed to continuing its leadership on this vitally important issue through its bilateral engagements worldwide.
- The United States has worked with partners to convert from HEU to LEU or verify the shutdown of **92 civilian research reactors and isotope production facilities**, thereby eliminating the use of HEU at these facilities;
  - The United States has also assisted 26 countries and Taiwan with the elimination of all HEU on their territories, and removed or confirmed disposition of more than 5 metric tons of vulnerable HEU and plutonium, enough for more than 200 nuclear weapons;
  - Working with our partners, the United States assisted with the downblending of **16.8 metric tons of civil HEU** and helped reduce the numbers of buildings and sites with weapons-useable nuclear materials;
  - **The United States through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency spent nearly $160 million and employed 24 personnel in 2014 pursuing counterproliferation programs, which included providing training and equipment to personnel from over 30 countries.**
  - U.S. bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements require that nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of these agreements is subject to adequate physical security. To ensure that physical protection measures over U.S.-obligated nuclear materials are comparable to the recommendations in IAEA publication INFCIRC/225, the United States has conducted **over 190 bilateral assessment visits to 50 countries** since 1974;
  - Additionally, the United States helped **complete security upgrades at 1,100 civilian buildings around the world containing high-priority at-risk radiological materials in 63 countries** since 2010 and helped **secure approximately 1,800 buildings** containing vulnerable, high-activity radiological sources in more than 100 countries since this cooperation was initiated;

- **The United States has taken tangible steps to counter nuclear and radiological smuggling and has negotiated bilateral Joint Action Plans with 13 partner countries outlining priority steps that we will jointly take to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling activities;**
- The United States has cooperated to procure over 300 vehicles and railcars for secure transportation of nuclear material in the United States and develop an automated transportation security system to ensure security of nuclear material shipments;
- **The United States continues to provide international training on insider threat mitigation and human reliability programs, in order to address the risk that a malicious insider could divert nuclear material, technology, or expertise;**
- The United States and our partners have jointly designed, completed, or upgraded several training centers to expand nuclear security training capabilities in partner countries;
- Since 2009, the United States has engaged bilaterally with 14 countries and international organizations on technical nuclear forensics best practices. Most notably, the United States, Japan, and France have made significant contributions to the area of uranium age dating, which is a key nuclear forensics measurement. The United States has also cooperated extensively with the IAEA on training and development of implementing guides on nuclear forensics methodologies; and
- **In 2012, the United States hosted the first International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security. This conference, which was attended by nearly 500 participants from over 30 countries, enhanced dialogue between security regulators worldwide.**

Improving Nuclear Security in the United States

- The United States also continues to improve domestic nuclear security by taking a number of actions such as:
  - Hosted an IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in 2013 to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and to the HEU reactor at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research.
  - **Installed security upgrades at over 240 domestic facilities.**
  - **Completed an upgrade to the physical security infrastructure of the Y-12 Plant including barriers, intrusion detection, and access control. Deployed additional razor wire, instituted new patrols, and installed additional physical barriers.**
  - **Completed construction on the High Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 Nuclear Security Complex which is one of the most robust secure facilities in the world consolidating significant amounts of highly enriched uranium.**

- **Completed upgrades to the physical security infrastructure at the Los Alamos National Laboratory including improved video and assessment capabilities, enhanced perimeter delay, and upgraded personnel and vehicle entry control features/facilities.**
- **Completed removal of special nuclear material items requiring highest levels of physical security protection from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.**
- **Completed an upgraded alarm management system/access control system installation at Sandia National Laboratories.**
- **Procured additional protective force vehicles and equipment, and improved monitoring of Physical Security Systems and monitoring of Physical Security Systems across all Department of Energy facilities.**
- **Removed 14,599 disused and unwanted radioactive sources from sites throughout the United States.**
- **Recovered over 4,390 domestic radiological sources from licensees that have identified no further use for those sources and repatriated U.S.-origin sources where feasible.**
- Continued to update existing regulations regarding the physical protection of nuclear plants and materials, taking into consideration the latest version of INFCIRC/225.
- **Implemented a cybersecurity regime for nuclear power plants that provides strong protection against cyber threats. The United States continues to work to apply a graded approach to the program, using risk insights.**
- **Amended domestic security regulations in 2013 for radioactive materials and codified requirements that had been imposed for risk-significant radioactive materials following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. These regulations established security requirements for IAEA Category 1 and 2 radioactive materials, as well as for shipments of small amounts of irradiated reactor fuel.**

iv. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

- In May 2011, the United States submitted the protocols to the Africa Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone and South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
- The United States and the other P5 states signed the Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in May 2014. **The Administration submitted this Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent in April 2015.**
- The United States is committed to signing the revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and continues to stand ready to assist in resolving remaining concerns.
- In accordance with the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan, the United States continues to support engagement of regional states on a conference on

the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery so that it can be held as soon as the regional states reach consensus on arrangements.

v. Compliance and Other Related Issues/Concerns

- In support of diplomatic efforts to restore compliance and respond to compliance challenges within the framework of the NPT, the IAEA and the UN Charter:
  - **The United States and its P5+1 partners, coordinated by the EU, have reached a political understanding with Iran that forms the basis for a long-term, comprehensive solution to the Iran nuclear issue. A Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if fully implemented, will give the international community confidence that Iran will not obtain a nuclear weapon and that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful going forward. The United States and its partners aim to conclude talks on the JCPOA by June 30, 2015.**
  - The United States continues to promote implementation of Iran-related United Nations Security Council resolutions.
  - The United States remains open to authentic and credible negotiations to bring North Korea into compliance with, **its commitments under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We have made it clear however that any resumption of talks must be premised on North Korea's demonstrated commitment to take concrete steps toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We continue to work with our partners and the entire international community to make it clear to North Korea that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, and continue to hold it to its international obligations and commitments** including to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and return, at an early date, to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.
  - The United States continues to strengthen and expand the scope of sanctions on North Korea, and continues concerted efforts to achieve robust domestic and international implementation of existing national and UN sanctions to impede North Korea's proliferation activities and curtail its ability to sustain and advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
  - The United States continues to hold Syria accountable for noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and calls on Syria to take the necessary steps to meet its non-proliferation obligations and cooperate fully with IAEA requests for access to all relevant locations, materials and persons.

vi. Other Contributions to Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation

- The United States continues to support the work of the Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 to foster its full implementation, including the legally binding obligations on all States related to a range of nuclear proliferation activities, to account for and

secure nuclear related materials, and to develop and maintain border and export controls on such items. For example:

- **Nationally, the United States has taken measures to implement all of the more than two hundred UNSCR 1540 obligations and recommendations.** The United States in 2013 provided the 1540 Committee with a report on these efforts including measures related to nuclear non-proliferation, and in 2014 submitted to the Committee a set of national effective practices, including those practices designed to combat nuclear proliferation.
- **Internationally, the United States supports the full range of Committee efforts to engage all 193 UN Member States and cooperate with nearly fifty international or regional organizations on implementing all aspects of the resolution. This support includes a $4.5 million contribution to the UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Affairs for activities to foster implementation of the resolution.**
- **Since its initial contribution in 2011, the U.S. contributions to the Trust Fund have helped UN Office for Disarmament Affairs support more than 70 activities, all of which promoted full implementation of UNSCR 1540 nuclear non-proliferation obligations and universal adherence to key nuclear non-proliferation treaties and conventions. In addition, the United States supports regular consultations between the 1540 Committee and the IAEA, the inclusion of nuclear non-proliferation topics in its country-specific dialogues, and participation by the Committee in international and regional nuclear non-proliferation activities**, such as the 2nd ASEAN Regional Forum Confidence Building Measures on UNSCR 1540, which focused on nuclear security issues.

- The United States leads and supports the implementation of other major activities to confront the threat posed by terrorist acquisition of nuclear and other radioactive material including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program (CNSP).
  - **The United States continues to Co-Chair the GICNT, which is a multilateral partnership of 86 partner nations and four official observers committed to strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.**
    - **Since it was launched by the United States and Russia in 2006, the GICNT has held over 70 multilateral activities, in particular across the GICNT's focus areas of nuclear forensics, detection, and emergency preparedness and response, which have brought together technical, operational, and policy experts.**
    - **These activities have explored key challenges in difficult or emerging areas of nuclear security, such as introducing nuclear forensic evidence in the courtroom, approaches to investigating illicit trafficking of nuclear material, and public messaging in response to a nuclear security incident, and have produced best practices and models for overcoming these challenges.**

- **As a complement to the multilateral activities of the GICNT, the United States, through the Department of State, diplomatically engages partner nations to build national capacities to counter nuclear and radiological material smuggling under the CNSP.**
- **Specifically, CNSP activities focus on increasing capabilities to respond to, investigate, and prosecute incidents of nuclear or radiological material smuggling, including by enhancing national nuclear forensics expertise.**

- **The United States supports international efforts to counter proliferators' ability to abuse the global financial system to support the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).**
  - **The United States has implemented both targeted financial sanctions and broader financial measures to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the prevention, suppression, and disruption of WMD proliferation and its financing.**
  - **The United States also strongly supports the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on enhancing states' efforts to counter proliferation finance. The FATF has issued detailed guidance to assist jurisdictions with the implementation of the financial provisions in proliferation-related Security Council resolutions as well as ensuring effective domestic-level cooperation and coordination on proliferation finance.**
  - **The United States regularly engages partners to reinforce and encourage implementation of effective measures to combat proliferation financing.**
- The United States is supporting efforts by NPT Parties to address the prospect of withdrawal by a State Party, including through consultations on recommendations for actions Parties could take consistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

Section III: Reporting on National Measures Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

i. Promoting Peaceful Uses

- The United States is dedicated to international cooperation on the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with Article IV of the NPT. The United States meets its commitment in a variety of ways, including through nuclear trade and technical assistance through the IAEA and other means.

Nuclear Trade and Technical Assistance

- The United States supports the safe implementation of peaceful nuclear technology abroad through licensing transfers of nuclear material, equipment, and assistance.
- Since 2010, the United States has made over $2.5 billion worth of nuclear equipment, materials and technology available to States involved in nuclear

power programs in accordance with agreements for cooperation establishing the highest levels of non-proliferation, safety, and security standards.

- Since 2010, the United States has issued **595 licenses** supporting exports of nuclear material, equipment, technology, and transfers of assistance benefitting at least 35 countries and the European Union.
- To facilitate peaceful nuclear trade and to improve security, the United States has worked to streamline the licensing process for nuclear material, equipment, technology, and assistance transfers.

Bilateral Cooperation

- The United States has in place 22 bilateral agreements pursuant to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (123 Agreements) that provide for cooperation with 49 partners (including the 28 EURATOM states), the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the authorities on Taiwan. We are pursuing bilateral agreements with additional partners. These agreements have fostered the development of over 70 GW of clean nuclear power worldwide.
- In addition, to supply LEU for the continuing operation of research reactors, the United States has, since 2010, entered into IAEA Project and Supply Agreements (PSAs) with Chile, Mexico, Jamaica, and Peru.
- To support the safe and secure use of peaceful nuclear applications, the U.S. Department of Energy has 20 bilateral cooperative arrangements. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has bilateral technical information exchange arrangements with **45 states** (including EURATOM states) and Taiwan. More partnerships are being formed.
- In 2011, the United States announced the availability of nuclear fuel from the American Assured Fuel Supply (AAFS), a reserve of approximately 230 tons of LEU, which is derived from down-blending 17.4 metric tons of HEU declared excess to defense needs. The AAFS is available to any partner country of the United States if such a partner were to face a critical need for enriched uranium that could not otherwise be met by the commercial market.
- The United States contributed nearly $50 million to the IAEA to support establishment of a fuel bank of LEU to assure Member States of a reliable supply of fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors.

Capacity Building

- The U.S. Department of State's Partnership for Nuclear Security (PNS) seeks to promote a self-sufficient nuclear security culture ingrained in partner countries nuclear technical organizations. PNS works around the world with partner counties that are considering or managing nuclear research facilities and power plants. In order to do so, PNS:
  - Works with partner institutions to develop and sustain trustworthiness programs (i.e. human reliability programs, fitness-for-duty, etc.) to mitigate potential insider threats at nuclear facilities.

- Provides training for nuclear technical experts to promote and demonstrate security culture as a vital component of nuclear applications and operations.
- Empowers partners to institutionalize nuclear security trainings through train-the-trainer initiatives, including professional development courses and academic curriculum development.

• Through the IAEA, the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, and bilaterally, the United States supports the efforts of countries considering nuclear power to build the national infrastructure needed to pursue the highest standards for safety, security and non-proliferation.

• **Through assistance activities such as the Radiation Sources Regulatory Partnership program and the International Regulatory Development Partnership program, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has, since 2010, provided support, both bilaterally and through the IAEA to over 130 countries, and contributed a total of nearly $17 million both cash and cost free contributions to IAEA's nuclear safety and security activities.**

ii. Technical Assistance through the IAEA to its Member States

Technical Cooperation Program and Peaceful Uses Initiative

• Since 2010, the United States has provided **more than $190 million** to the IAEA to support technical cooperation and promotional programs. This figure includes:

- **Over $108 million to support the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF),** or about 25 percent of the total. Technical cooperation (TC) projects are having a positive humanitarian impact in the developing countries of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the fields of human health, agriculture and food security, isotope hydrology and water management, the environment and climate change, and nuclear energy infrastructure and sustainability. The U.S. TCF contribution, faithfully furnished for decades, supports on a collective basis the same kinds of projects supported individually by U.S. contributions to the IAEA's Peaceful Uses Initiative, as described below.
- **Over $33 million to support IAEA technical cooperation above and beyond projects funded through the TCF.** This covers in-kind and monetary support towards training, technical expertise, fellowships, and cost-free experts. For example, such U.S. support contributed to:
  - Training in nuclear applications, including by sending **over 1,400 experts** to participate in IAEA technical meetings, workshops, and conferences in 2014.
  - Initial phase of IAEA efforts to renovate the IAEA Nuclear Sciences and Applications Laboratories in Seibersdorf (ReNuAL). **At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States announced an additional commitment of $2 million towards this project.**
- **Over $50 million to support the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI).** Contributions to the PUI from the United States and other international

donors have provided the IAEA with additional flexibility and resources to support high priority IAEA Member State projects and to respond to unforeseen challenges, sometimes on short notice. More than 150 IAEA Member States have benefitted from the PUI. Individually or partnering with other PUI donors, the United States has contributed through the PUI to IAEA technical assistance activities that include:

- Establishment of the Ocean Acidification International Coordination Center at the IAEA Environment Laboratories in Monaco to promote global actions against ocean acidification;
- **Building capacity to detect, quantify, and reduce the adverse impacts of harmful algal toxins on seafood safety in countries throughout the world; development of a Caribbean observing network for ocean acidification**;
- Design of a large-scale water resource management project to respond to sustained drought and widespread starvation and malnutrition in the Sahel region of Africa;
- Development of a sustainable zone free of the tsetse fly in the Niayes region of Senegal to relieve the burden of trypanosomiasis and increase food and agricultural productivity;
- **Improvement of veterinary laboratory capacities in Sub-Saharan Africa for rapid and specific diagnosis of transboundary animal diseases;**
- Enhancement of laboratory capacity in Latin America to ensure food safety and reduce the threat that fruit flies pose to agriculture resources; **control of fruit flies in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean region to enhance agricultural productivity; development of treatments for use worldwide against exotic fruit flies to promote the safe import, export, and domestic movement of commodities;**
- **Building capacity to improve food safety and quality in numerous countries throughout the world through nuclear technology and sustainable technology transfer to developing countries;**
- **Assessment of the impact of climate change on polar and mountainous regions; mitigation of climate change effects in Southeast Asia by assessing sediment processes, adapting rice-based cropping systems, and improving crop management strategies;**
- **Enhancement of the capacity of national monitoring teams in Africa to ensure early detection of zoonotic diseases, including the Ebola Virus Disease, under high biosafety conditions;**
- Assessment and strengthening of national capabilities to detect and treat cancer, including radiotherapy treatment capacity, in more than 30 countries around the world;

- Advancement of education and training in nuclear medicine, as well as application of nuclear techniques to improve the treatment of cardiac and cancer patients;
- **Enhancement of national capabilities to respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies in Africa;**
- Study of the possible impact of radioactive releases following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident;
- **Improvement of the control of radioactive sources in Africa and the Mediterranean region;**
- **Strengthening of biological dosimetry in the Asia and Pacific region;**
- **Promotion of the sustainable development of uranium resources in Africa; and**
- **Development of nuclear power infrastructure, including capacity building of human resources and legal and regulatory framework, in numerous countries throughout the world.**

• **At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the United States announced an additional commitment of $50 million to the PUI over the next five years.**

iii. Nuclear Safety & Civil Nuclear Liability

• Through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the United States has concluded arrangements for technical cooperation on nuclear safety matters with 45 countries, EURATOM, and Taiwan.

• **In early 2015, the United States and other Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, confirming their commitment to the legal obligations under the CNS and implementing safety principles and lessons learned arising from the 2011 Great Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power plant accident in Japan.**

• The United States has participated extensively on nuclear safety issues within the IAEA and other international venues.

• The United States **takes an active role in the G7 Nuclear Safety and Security Group that seeks to, among other things, achieve an efficient and effective** implementation of the IAEA Action Plan for Nuclear Safety.

• The United States has actively promoted the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) to be a global nuclear liability regime and urged other countries to join. **With Japan's ratification, the CSC entered into force on April 15, 2015.**

• **The United States works closely with the G7/EC to support Ukraine in returning the damaged Chornobyl Unit 4 reactor site to an environmentally safe and stable condition. As the largest bilateral donor to the EBRD Chornobyl Shelter Fund, the United States seeks to put this legacy issue to rest.**

- To promote nuclear safety in over 60 Member States and at the regional level across the globe, the United States has made regular extra-budgetary contributions to the IAEA for Nuclear Safety, including for the Nuclear Safety Action Plan. The United States contributed **$3.8 million in 2014, and since 2010 has contributed $16 million.**

- The United States has contributed funding and personnel to the Asian Nuclear Safety Network which assists countries in the area planning to have domestic civil nuclear power programs to build infrastructure.

iv. Other Related Issues

Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Outreach and Education

- The United States has long supported the role of education and training programs to maintain a healthy global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Drawing on our cadre of non-proliferation and disarmament experts, we are working to promote public awareness, develop educational tools, and expand career opportunities for the next generation of non-proliferation and disarmament experts. The U.S. Government is:

  - Working with the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training to record oral histories of senior arms control and non-proliferation officials and leaders in the field for public access through the Library of Congress;

  - Engaging with the UN Association to bring experts to classrooms to guide simulations of current non-proliferation and disarmament scenarios;

  - Supporting the annual Generation Prague Conference which has brought together **approximately 300 young professionals and experienced practitioners** from around the world to exchange perspectives on issues concerning them and their home countries. The purpose of the conference is to focus on the role of younger generations in fulfilling the President's vision of a world without nuclear weapons;

  - Making use of virtual and in-house internships and programs that allow students from high school and upwards to work directly with policy-makers and scientists for up to two years and demonstrating the importance of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) to the field of non-proliferation and arms control; and

  - Hosting and attending hundreds of outreach events that demonstrate the U.S. commitment to educate U.S. citizens and citizens of the world about the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and the opportunities to promote international peace and security.

- The United States has assisted over 30 international universities in incorporating nuclear security into graduate and undergraduate nuclear engineering curriculums and trained over 4,000 students from more than 120 countries through IAEA physical protection training programs.

NPT/CONF.2015/39

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*

Report submitted by Belgium

The present report is submitted pursuant to action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). That action plan stipulates that "States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament', and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996."

Pillar I. Nuclear Disarmament

1. Policy

Belgium is firmly committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. This goal can be achieved through a gradual process of concrete, irreversible and verifiable reductions. Belgium is in favour of a building blocks approach, which can complement the pursuit of a step-by-step approach, since it allows the possibility of parallel and simultaneous steps.

We are convinced that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should remain the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. No other instrument is better defined or better equipped to guide us on the path towards the global zero. It is therefore essential that the NPT becomes truly universal. We call on the three remaining States, India, Israel and Pakistan, to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. At the same time, true universality is only achievable if the integrity of the Treaty is preserved. Those who violate the Treaty should be held accountable and return to compliance.

* The present document is issued without formal editing.

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Belgium is in favour of realistic proposals that lead to practical and effective disarmament. We call on all States with nuclear weapons to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals, to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine and security policies and to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. All nuclear weapon states should increase transparency with respect to their arsenals.

We have welcomed the conclusion of the New START Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. We are encouraged by the progress already achieved in the implementation of this Treaty. We call on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to seek further reductions of all types of nuclear weapons, including strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed weapons. In this regard, we have publicly welcomed the proposals formulated by President Obama in June 2013 to further deepen the reductions and to move beyond the current posture.

We encourage the United States of America and the Russian Federation to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of their bilateral nuclear weapons reduction and to further develop transparency and confidence-building measures. A first step could be to report on the current status of the implementation of the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and to consider verification measures.

Belgium acknowledges the progress made by the United Kingdom and France in reducing their nuclear stockpiles.

We firmly believe that every country, including non-nuclear-weapon states, has a role to play in creating an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Belgium has actively contributed to the elaboration of the new Strategic Concept (2010) and the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (2012). We have managed to further reduce the role, numbers and readiness of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense posture, to confirm the de-targeting and de-alerting status of the nuclear components and to promote increased transparency and nuclear confidence building measures. NATO acknowledges that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. Belgium remains in favour of reciprocal confidence building and transparency measures with Russia and increased understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force posture in Europe.

Belgium is concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian impact of a nuclear detonation. This concern underpins all our efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. Belgium joined other nations to express our concern over the issue in two joint statements, which were pronounced by Australia at the sixty-eighth and the sixty-ninth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. Belgium participated in the international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo (2013), Nayarit (2014) and Vienna (2014). In cooperation with civil society, Belgium promotes disarmament and non-proliferation education, which, inter alia, contributes to raising public awareness of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

2. *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)*

A number of essential elements are still missing from the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of them. The Treaty makes an important contribution towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of weapons. Belgium calls on all States concerned to adhere to the CTBT without further delay. A special responsibility rests with the Annex 2 states, which hold the key to the entry into force of the CTBT. We believe that adherence should not be made contingent upon the action of other states. Belgium ratified the CTBT on 29 June 1999.

As a member of the European Union, Belgium participates actively and financially in the efforts to promote the universalization of the CTBT. Belgium served as Vice President of the conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was held in New York in September 2013. Belgium supported the Final Declaration adopted at that conference. Belgium associated itself with the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted at the seventh ministerial meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was held in New York in September 2014.

In order to strengthen the verification regime of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Belgium contributes to the efforts to minimize the interference of radio-xenon releases with the capability of the International Monitoring System to detect nuclear explosions. The Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN), in collaboration with the Institute for Radioelements (IRE) and the Royal Meteorological Office, and financed in the context of the EU Council Decision V program, is studying possible options to mitigate radio-xenon stemming from medical isotope production facilities. The study examines the possibilities for absorbing radio-xenon isotopes by different materials and methods and develops a filtration system. By mitigating radio-xenon emissions from civilian applications, future emissions — which remain a key indicator to monitor and verify nuclear activity — would be more reliably attributed to nuclear explosions.

The Institute for Radioelements (IRE) was the first major worldwide radioisotope producer to take the initiative to voluntarily sign a pledge with the CTBTO in June 2013 to cooperate with the CTBTO to mitigate the effects of noble gas emissions. IRE will provide the Secretariat of the Treaty with its accurate radio-xenon monitoring data contributing to the optimization of the modelization models of the noble gas background. The IRE has thereby pioneered the path for a higher involvement of the radiopharmaceutical companies in the non-proliferation efforts.

Furthermore, the relevant Belgian institutions are dedicating important R&D efforts to develop materials to efficiently trap radioxenon from medical isotope facilities and to build a mobile demonstration set-up. Other R&D efforts in support of CTBTO are related to the modeling of atmospheric transport and dispersion, especially concerning uncertainty quantification of such model calculations.

Belgium will host a CTBTO Workshop on "Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production" (WOSMIP) in May 2015, in close cooperation with the US Department of Energy. This workshop will be an important milestone to

better understand the issue of radio-xenon releases and to deepen the dialogue between producers and the scientific community.

Belgium also supports the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) "Sharing and Developing Protocols to Further Minimize Radioactive Gaseous Releases to the Environment in the Manufacture of Medical Radioisotopes, as Good Manufacture Practices."

3. *Conference on Disarmament — Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)*

Another crucial building block is the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), aimed at banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Belgium supports the work undertaken by the Group of Governmental Experts, which was created by UNGA resolution 67/53. We hope that their final report will contain practical recommendations which will help to pave the way for the negotiation of a FMCT, which is the next logical step along the path towards a world without nuclear weapons. Pending such a Treaty, all States possessing nuclear weapons should maintain or declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

The revitalization of the UN disarmament machinery, and in particular of the Conference on Disarmament, is a priority for Belgium. Belgium will continue to actively support all efforts to overcome the present stalemate in the Conference, which includes the failure to agree on a program of work. Belgium believes that the Conference should start its work immediately on the basis of a substantive and balanced program of work, with the commencement of negotiations on a FMCT as its priority.

4. *Verification*

Belgium supports initiatives seeking to identify and address the technical challenges related to the verification of nuclear disarmament, notably through its participation to the "International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification."

5. *United Nations*

Within the framework of the United Nations, Belgium has supported a variety of resolutions calling for nuclear disarmament, reducing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons and other related issues. Belgium is co-sponsor of the General Assembly Resolutions on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; United Action Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia; the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; Preventing the Acquisition by Terrorists of Radioactive Sources; and Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Belgium participated actively in the work of the "Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons", established by General Assembly Resolution 67/56 of 3 December 2012. Belgium joined other States in submitting a working paper on "Building Blocks for a World without Nuclear Weapons."

Pillar II. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

1. *Safeguards*

Belgium supports the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in providing the international community with credible assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear programs. Belgium is of the view that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with an Additional Protocol, constitutes the current verification standard. We call on all States that have not done so to conclude such agreements at the earliest possible date. Belgium brought into force a safeguards agreement in 1977 and an Additional Protocol was concluded in 1998.

Belgium supports the work of the IAEA in the field of safeguards. The Belgian support program to the IAEA safeguards includes the participation in dedicated work groups, training of inspectors and research.

2. *Export controls*

Belgium contributes to non-proliferation efforts through its system of robust export controls, which ensure that nuclear materials and nuclear technology will be used for peaceful purposes only. Export control is governed by the dual use Regulation N°428/2009 of the European Union complemented by a dedicated national legislation. Belgium is a member of the Zangger Committee (ZC) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Nuclear transfers between Belgium and other States are fully consistent with the guidelines under the ZC and NSG.

3. *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540*

Belgium applies the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). As a member of the European Union, Belgium contributes to the efforts to facilitate the implementation of this resolution throughout the world.

4. *Nuclear security*

A) *Legal framework*

Belgium has a robust nuclear security regime for its civilian nuclear installations, which we continue to enhance. Over the last years, Belgium has strengthened and updated its legal and regulatory framework regarding the physical protection of nuclear installations. Legislation has been adopted in compliance with the relevant international conventions, in particular with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment. The modification of the Penal Code in 2013 has made our legislation fully consistent with the 2005 Amendment, which we ratified in January 2013. It is also fully consistent with the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism (ICSANT), which we ratified on 2 October 2009. In addition, our legal and regulatory framework reflects the NSS 13 (INFCIRC/225) document as revised and other documents from the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

As a contribution to the efforts of the IAEA to facilitate adherence to the 2005 CPPNM Amendment, Belgium hosted a Regional workshop for French-speaking African States in Brussels in 2013.

B) Nuclear security culture

Nuclear security is for Belgium an essential element of a responsible nuclear program. In this context, securing nuclear material in Belgium has been, from the beginning, the purpose of a culture of constant vigilance.

Following the Fukushima Daichi accident, Belgium applied the stress tests of the European Union to all its major nuclear installations. Moreover, Belgium took the initiative to also perform stress tests relating to man-made events, including malicious events, such as air crashes and cyber-attacks.

Belgium commends the value of the Nuclear Security Advisory Services of the IAEA. In 2014, Belgium hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. Belgium has also provided experts to a number of IPPAS missions in other States.

The Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN) continues to develop the innovative accelerator-driven reactor project MYRRHA (Multi-purpose hybrid research reactor for high-tech applications), with the main objective of providing the research community with a highly performing and versatile installation to carry out material and fuel testing, notably in relation to the safety of the current and future fission and fusion reactors. It will also to demonstrate the transmutation of long-lived and most toxic radioactive waste and support fundamental nuclear research.

C) Nuclear Security Summit process

Belgium has participated in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process since its start in Washington DC in 2010. This process has improved the security of nuclear material worldwide and thus reduced the chances that such material could fall into the hands of terrorists or criminals. Apart from fully supporting the outcome of these Summits, Belgium has voluntarily committed itself to a number of gift baskets. At The Hague NSS in March 2014, Belgium joined the gift baskets "Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation", "Information Security Initiative", "Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain", and "Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers/Centers of Excellence."

Belgium has made a voluntary national contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund of the IAEA each year since 2010. Our total contribution since 2010 amounts to 1,5 million USD. The Nuclear Security Fund is further supported by significant contributions from the European Union.

D) Minimization of sensitive nuclear material

Belgium is committed to the efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian purposes, when economically and technically feasible.

Belgium has been working towards the timely conversion to low enriched uranium (LEU), subject to regulatory approval, of:

- the high performance research reactor BR2 of the Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN) , as soon as an appropriate high density fuel has been qualified and licensed for this purpose;

– the processing facility of the Institute for Radioelements (IRE) for medical radio-isotopes.

With regards to the first point, the SCK•CEN is actively leading the international efforts to design and qualify in the BR2 reactor different high density LEU fuels, which are candidates to replace HEU fuel, not only for its own reactor BR2, but also for foreign high performance reactors in France and the United States of America.

With regards to the second point, the IRE has started the necessary research and development activities and technical investment studies to timely convert its processing facilities to LEU in close cooperation with the appropriate institutions of the United States of America.

While this complex process is underway, we continue to guarantee the production of medical radioisotopes, an essential contribution to human healthcare worldwide.

In 2014, Belgium transferred to the United States of America significant quantities of excess HEU and separated plutonium, for which use was no longer foreseen, in collaboration with the appropriate institutions of the United States of America.

E) Radioactive Sources

Belgium applies the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Belgium is a cosponsor of the biannual United Nations General Assembly resolution "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources".

5. Other international initiatives

Belgium is a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international initiative aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, with a particular focus on the illegal trade and the transport of weapons of mass destruction and related material.

As a member of the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Belgium has contributed to projects aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive material.

Belgium is a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which was created in 2006 with the aim to strengthen the capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism.

6. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

Belgium acknowledges the contribution Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones can make to regional and global peace and security, on the basis of agreements freely arrived at by the States of the regions concerned. We welcome the signing by the nuclear weapon states of a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia in May 2014.

Belgium is committed to the implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East. Belgium fully supports the efforts of the Facilitator, Finnish Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, to convene a conference in Helsinki on the

establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We regret that the conference could not be held yet. We call on all States concerned to engage constructively and to agree as soon as possible on the practical arrangements for that conference.

7. *Compliance and other issues*

Ensuring compliance with non-proliferation commitments is a prerequisite for preserving the integrity of the Treaty. Belgium has condemned the nuclear test of February 2013 conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Belgium has supported the strengthening of the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime against the DPRK.

Belgium supports the ongoing diplomatic efforts between the E3/EU+3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement that would guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Belgium has voluntarily contributed 150.000 EUR to fund the enhanced verification activities of the IAEA in Iran, in execution of the Joint Plan of Action, agreed between the E3/EU+3 and Iran in November 2013. Belgium has rigorously implemented the UNSC sanctions, as well as the additional sanctions that were imposed by the European Union.

We call on Syria to resolve the issue of its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and to adhere to an Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

Pillar III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Belgium fully supports the rights of States Parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as enshrined in the NPT. We are dedicated to international cooperation on the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have actively contributed to enhancing civil nuclear energy cooperation, notably through bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and through EURATOM cooperation agreements.

The comprehensive system for nuclear export controls, described above, is also a tool that facilitates commerce by providing assurances that exported equipment is solely used for peaceful purposes.

Belgium supports the Technical Cooperation Program of the IAEA through its annual voluntary contributions. Belgium regularly accepts fellowships on its territory in the framework of this program.

Belgium contributes to the work of the IAEA, notably through the organization of workshops and training courses, and the participation in research programs. The Belgian Nuclear Research Centre (SCK•CEN) is founder of the "IAEA Underground Research Facilities Network".

Belgium supports the full implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, adopted in September 2011.

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle can help to ensure nuclear fuel supply to States developing a nuclear energy program in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. In this regard, Belgium contributes to the establishment of a LEU Fuel Bank in Kazakhstan, as a member of the European Union. The EU has contributed 20 million EUR and pledged up to another 5 million EUR to this project. Belgium calls on concerned parties to accelerate the conclusion of all necessary arrangements to make the start-up of this project possible.

NPT/CONF.2015/40

2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament*

Report submitted by Mexico

1. The present report updates the information contained in document NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/7 of 24 April 2014. It therefore includes only information updated after that date, in compliance with action 20 of the action plan set forth in the final document of the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2010, in particular, implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996, in order to encourage greater efforts to be made in this regard and promote the presentation of such information by nuclear-weapon States.

2. In that regard, Mexico has been a regular, active and committed advocate of disarmament and has stressed the urgent need to totally eliminate weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, in accordance with the principles of verification, irreversibility and transparency. The efforts made by Mexico in this field are founded primarily on international law, as well as the foreign policy principles enshrined in the Mexican Constitution and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. Mexico shares the goal of universal application of existing international instruments, in addition to their full implementation, strengthening and functioning, and supports the creation of new instruments.

* The present document is being issued without formal editing.

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4. It should be recalled that nuclear weapons are the only weapons of mass destruction not expressly prohibited by international law. This leads some to believe that such weapons confer "prestige" on their owners, or that they guarantee collective security, ideas that Mexico has rejected practically since the birth of the nuclear era almost 70 years ago.

5. Mexico advocates consideration of the damage caused by nuclear weapons and of their consequences as the basis for an eventual and necessary prohibition.

6. Mexico's efforts as one of the leading proponents of the so-called "humanitarian initiative" have included submitting, at various forums where issues of nuclear disarmament are addressed, a joint declaration on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons as the basis for disarmament actions and as the reason why such weapons must not be used again, in any circumstance. The number of endorsements of that declaration rose from 16 in 2012 to 80 in 2013 and 157 in October 2014.

7. The humanitarian initiative was born of the frustration of non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, together with the deadlock in the disarmament machinery and forums (mainly the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament) of the United Nations General Assembly for almost twenty years. Nuclear weapons are addressed at multilateral forums from a political and legal perspective rather than in relation to their effects, which is why we, the founders of this movement, agreed to help to stigmatize these weapons, as a step towards their prohibition and elimination, based on hard factual data on their impact.

8. The presentation of data on the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons at the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo (2013), the State of Nayarit (Mexico) and Vienna (both in 2014), showed the international community's interest in the field, and the paradigm shift that has taken place.

9. Moreover, at the Nayarit Conference, the Chair (Mexico) stressed that the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should lead to the commitment of States and civil society to reach new international standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument, and that the time had come to initiate a diplomatic process conducive to that goal. The process should comprise a specific time frame, the definition of the most appropriate forums and a clear and substantive framework to achieve it (see NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.35).

10. At the Vienna Conference, at least 44 countries endorsed the Nayarit conclusions in order to initiate a diplomatic process aimed at a legally binding instrument that prohibits nuclear weapons as a step towards their total elimination, under international supervision, with a timetable for its implementation.

11. Mexico reiterated that the Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna discussions and conclusions must feed into a diplomatic process leading to the negotiation and conclusion of a legally binding instrument on prohibition. In that regard, Mexico invited all States to give this course of action serious consideration, as a demonstration of their commitment to the very survival of humanity.

12. Furthermore, one outcome of the Vienna Conference was a pledge from the Austrian Government (Austrian Pledge) to disseminate the results of the Conference

in order to encourage the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to renew their commitment, in particular to article VI, and to work to reduce the risks associated with nuclear weapons. In that regard, every effort will be made to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian consequences and associated risks. The Austrian Pledge has been endorsed by 78 countries, including Mexico.

13. In that regard, and recognizing the contribution of the humanitarian initiative to its members, during the third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), held in Costa Rica in January 2015, its 33 members (including Mexico) reiterated their commitment to continue promoting full and verifiable nuclear disarmament, and gave their strong support to the call made in Nayarit to initiate a diplomatic negotiation process for an internationally legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This has consolidated regional unity around an important issue and strengthens the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament: the elimination of the danger posed to humanity by nuclear weapons.

14. The Special Declaration also reiterated that Latin American and Caribbean countries were proud to belong to the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area and stressed their full support for the work of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) as the "specialized body in the region" in the field of nuclear disarmament.

15. CELAC also endorsed a proposal made by Cuba at the Vienna Conference for the countries of the region to promote the negotiation of a global legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons at the seventieth session of the General Assembly, to be held in September 2015.

16. In parallel with this process, and in the framework of preparations for the ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 27 April-22 May 2015), Mexico has continued to participate in the various forums that address the nuclear disarmament agenda.

United Nations General Assembly

17. Mexico coordinated the work of the New Agenda Coalition[1] during the second half of 2015, which included submitting to the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, held in 2014, a draft resolution entitled, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", adopted as resolution 69/37 by 169 votes to 7, with 5 abstentions. It is worth noting that this resolution is the only one considered by the General Assembly that addresses in detail the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States in the 13 steps towards disarmament adopted in 2000 within the framework of the Treaty, and which proposes concrete measures to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Coalition maintains that, to comply with those commitments, there should be multilateral negotiations on effective measures to halt the arms race in compliance with the Treaty, including the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

[1] Comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa.

18. Mexico also coordinated the drafting of the statements made by the Coalition during the general debate and the thematic debate on nuclear disarmament in the First Committee at the aforementioned session.

19. Furthermore, Mexico also submitted four other draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session:

(a) United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, adopted without a vote as resolution 69/65, submitted biennially in collaboration with Japan, pursuant to which reports are submitted on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the 2002 United Nations study on this matter. For Mexico, education and the promotion of the values, activities and objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation are essential to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The most significant activities carried out by Mexico in relation to nuclear disarmament are the inclusion of material on disarmament and non-proliferation in the curricula of the Ministries of Defence and of the Navy and the holding of a summer course on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for Latin American diplomats, coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies;

(b) United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, adopted without a vote as resolution 69/71, submitted biennially in collaboration with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, aimed at disseminating information on arms control and disarmament in order to provide the necessary tools for States, international organizations, civil society and research institutes to participate fully in deliberations and negotiations on disarmament held in the various United Nations bodies, and assisting them in complying with treaties and contributing to agreed mechanisms for transparency;

(c) Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, adopted as resolution 69/41 by 154 votes to 5, with 20 abstentions, submitted for the first time in 2012, together with Austria and Norway, in order to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations and end the paralysis in the United Nations disarmament machinery. Note also:

(i) In 2012, together with Austria and Norway, Mexico submitted resolution 67/56 entitled, "Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations", by which an open-ended working group was established. The group met three times in 2013 (14-24 May, 27 June and 19-30 August) during the recess periods of the Conference on Disarmament and was chaired by Costa Rica. The goal was to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, and representatives from some 70 countries, many of them non-members of the Conference on Disarmament, participated, along with international organizations and civil society;

(ii) During the deliberations, the participants recognized the persistent lack, for more than a decade, of concrete outcomes from multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations held within the framework of the United Nations, and they stressed the importance and urgency of making substantial progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. In order to ensure continuity in the work of the Group, the General Assembly adopted resolution 68/46 at its sixty-eighth session, calling on countries to submit a report on the matter in 2014. In

that regard, on behalf of Austria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Slovenia and Switzerland, Ireland submitted resolution 69/41 by which it was decided to review in 2015 "progress made in the implementation of the present resolution, to take stock of all relevant efforts undertaken and to further explore options for taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, including if necessary through the Working Group";

(d) Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, adopted as resolution 69/81 by 179 votes to 1 and three abstentions, submitted annually together with Australia and New Zealand, addressing the entry into force of the Treaty, urging the eight States whose accession and/or ratification is needed, pursuant to Annex 2 to the Treaty, to do so as soon as possible, as a fundamental step toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

20. Mexico took part in the meeting convened by the Secretary-General in New York on 26 September 2014 to commemorate the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in order to raise the awareness of the international community of the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity of their total elimination, by mobilizing international efforts towards achieving the common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. In Mexico City, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed the day by inviting the diplomatic corps accredited in Mexico to a screening of the film "In my lifetime", which addresses the history of the nuclear era.

Conference on Disarmament

21. From 19 January to 15 February 2015, Mexico assumed the rotating presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the forum established by the General Assembly for the negotiation of binding disarmament agreements. The Conference has neither adopted nor implemented a programme of work since 1996, meaning that no new nuclear disarmament agreements have been negotiated in almost 20 years.

22. Mexico submitted for consideration by the member States a draft programme of work for the Conference for the whole year, based on the agenda items, including the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters (such as the prohibition of nuclear weapons); the prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; the comprehensive programme of disarmament; and transparency in armament. However, it was once again impossible to adopt the programme of work owing to the forum's consensus rule, because it grants the 65 members of the Conference a de facto power of veto.

23. Mexico also submitted two draft decisions which were rejected, concerning participation by civil society at the Conference and the establishment of a working group to review the methods of work.

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

24. As a State party and the headquarters of the Agency (the only one with its headquarters in Mexico) established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), for which it is the depositary, Mexico has played an active role in the sessions of the OPANAL Council, as a full member, since 1 January 2014 (its term will end on 31 December 2017). Accordingly, it presided over the work of the Agency in the months of May and June of 2014 and March and April of 2015.

25. It also took part in the twenty-third special session of the General Conference of OPANAL, held in Mexico City in November 2014, at which Mexico reiterated its position in favour of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is worth noting that given the fact that the Treaty of Tlatelolco already prohibited nuclear weapons in the region, its parties promote global prohibition, in line with the Treaty itself and with the commitments assumed by CELAC.

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New York, 27 April-22 May 2015

Note verbale dated 4 May 2015 from the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations addressed to the Office for Disarmament Affairs

The Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations has the honour to submit, on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States, the *P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms* as a document of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is available from www.china-un.org/chn/zgylhg/cjyjk/npt/P020150429799791542198.pdf.

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Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Algeria*

1. During the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in 2010, the States parties undertook, in the terms of action 20 of the action plan within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, to submit regular reports on the implementation of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference as well as of article VI of the NPT, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The goal of submitting reports is to provide the transparency needed for verification.

2. The present report addresses implementation by Algeria of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference, as well as the practical steps adopted by the 2000 Conference.

Article I

3. In the terms of article I of the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States are legally bound by the undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, to any recipient whatsoever. They have also undertaken not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to acquire such weapons. Fully respecting those undertakings is a primary consideration in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

4. Algeria urges nuclear-weapon States, under the Treaty, to ensure comprehensive implementation of that article, in particular by avoiding nuclear cooperation with States that are not party to the Treaty. Cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty would encourage those States not to accede to it. Nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a special responsibility in the implementation of that article in order to achieve universality of the Treaty.

* This document has not been formally edited.

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Article II

5. Since its accession to the Treaty, on 12 January 1995, Algeria, which is a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty, has continued to fully observe and implement article II. In the same spirit, Algeria is a State party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

6. Algeria remains convinced that disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction are vital to preserve and consolidate international peace and security and for socio-economic development.

Article III

7. In accordance with its obligations and commitments under article III of the Treaty, in 1996 Algeria concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under the terms of that agreement, Algeria's two research reactors are regularly inspected by the Agency. Verification by IAEA has always confirmed Algeria's respect for its obligations under the Treaty.

Article IV

8. Algeria attaches the greatest importance to the preservation of the inalienable right, under article IV of the Treaty, of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. Algeria cannot accede to any measure or action of any kind which might restrict that right. All States parties to the Treaty have the right to benefit from all peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology provided that they respect the obligations under articles I, II and III.

Article V

9. Algeria has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, since it is a party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) which bans nuclear tests.

Algeria plays an active part in efforts and initiatives aimed at promoting the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus it voted in favour of resolution 69/81, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2014. It actively participates in meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organization and its bodies in order to convey its commitment to the entry into force of the treaty and to contribute to the consolidation of progress made in establishing the verification regime. In addition, Algeria continues to take part in meetings of the Conference to promote the entry into force of the Treaty, often referred to as the Article XIV conference, as well as in the ministerial meetings of the Friends of the CTBT which it sponsors.

Algeria also participated at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, held in September 2014 in New York.

Algeria urges all States that have yet to do so, especially those listed in annex 2 to the Treaty which have a special responsibility concerning its entry into force, to ratify it without delay.

10. Algeria is convinced that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is one of the actions in the 2010 action plan, one of the practical steps adopted at the 2000 Conference and one of the measures identified by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, would bring about the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of new nuclear-weapon systems and thereby prevent their vertical proliferation.

Article VI

11. Algeria deplores the scant progress made in implementing article VI of the NPT, the commitments undertaken in the framework of the 2010 action plan and the practical steps of 2000 with respect to nuclear disarmament.

12. The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons stockpiled or deployed by nuclear-weapon States and the persistence of deterrence theories that assert the usefulness of such weapons to safeguard the security of those States and preserve stability give grounds for concern and run counter to the spirit of the CTBT and to commitments undertaken to get rid of nuclear weapons. This irrefutable fact could be construed as a factor eroding the credibility of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and it threatens to impair the authority of the Treaty.

13. Algeria continues to call for negotiations in good faith to implement fully article VI of the Treaty, particularly unequivocal commitment. In this context, it considers that it is not enough just to reaffirm the validity of the commitments undertaken at the 1995, 2000, and 2010 Review Conferences. It would therefore be useful for the 2015 Review Conference to agree on new specific, remediable and measurable steps in line with established time frames for disposing of nuclear weapons.

14. Algeria has supported all pertinent General Assembly resolutions calling for nuclear disarmament. Thus, it actively participated in the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. It subscribed to resolution 68/32 of 10 December 2013 on the follow up to that meeting which called for the commencement of negotiations on a nuclear disarmament agreement in the Conference on Disarmament, decided to convene a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament, and declared 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Algeria also played an active part in, and contributed to the work of, the Open-ended Working Group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations (document A/514 of 9 October 2013),

15. In addition, Algeria actively participated in three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that took place in Oslo in 2013, in Nayarit in Mexico and in Vienna in 2014. Algeria considers that this initiative provides a real opportunity to revitalize nuclear disarmament and go beyond the current status quo by encouraging an approach aimed at filling in legal and political and establishing an instrument banning these weapons.

16. In the Conference on Disarmament, Algeria continues to support all efforts to promote the emergence of a consensus surrounding a comprehensive and balanced work programme that would enable the Conference to resume negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Article VII

17. Algeria believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, based on voluntary agreements, effectively enhances regional peace and security and contributes towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament.

18. Algeria, which is a party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), welcomes the entry into force, in July 2009, of that Treaty, which makes an important contribution to global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. It continues to encourage and promote close cooperation between that Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Algeria likewise continues to advocate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as a confidence- and peace-building measure.

19. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is of particular importance to regional and international stability. Notwithstanding the fact that all States in the region have acceded to the Treaty on non-proliferation, the Middle East has yet to achieve that status because of Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty.

It was not possible to implement the mandate of the 2010 Review Conference to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, despite the constructive position adopted by countries in the region, except Israel, during consultations conducted by the Facilitator, Jaakko Laajava. Thus, Israel remains the sole obstacle to that conference being held and to the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

Algeria welcomes Mr. Laajava's efforts to ensure that a conference is held in Helsinki for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and reiterates its commitment to such a conference as the start of a process that should lead to the establishment of that zone, as called for in the resolution stemming from the 1995 NPT Review Conference under aegis of the United Nations.

20. Algeria calls on the international community and, in particular, nuclear-weapon States, to assume their responsibility to convene, as soon as possible, the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, pursuant to the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Article VIII

21. Algeria believes that the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 did not amount to recognition of an "indefinite" status for nuclear-weapon States. Algeria once again takes the opportunity, on the occasion of the ninth Review Conference, to underscore the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Article IX

22. Algeria believes that universality is necessary for the Treaty's credibility and effectiveness as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. In that regard, Algeria urges States that are not parties to the NPT to accede to the Treaty and submit their nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards regime.

23. Algeria highlights the importance of making the necessary efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty and to avoid taking steps that would undermine that objective.

Article X

24. Algeria is firmly committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as an essential element for international peace and stability. However, withdrawal from the instrument, as provided for in article X, is a sovereign right that must be exercised in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

25. Algeria emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not amount to indefinite recognition of the status as nuclear Powers of nuclear-weapon States. It must be recalled that the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely was taken in an overall context that included a decision on strengthening the Treaty review process, a decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, a decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty and a resolution on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Those decisions as a whole, the practical steps agreed on at the 2000 Conference, and the 2010 action plan to apply article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, are closely linked and remain valid.